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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2013 North Dakota enacted House Bill 1305, which purports to prohibit
doctors from performing abortions when they are aware that the abortion is sought
solely for purposes of sex selection or because the fetus has been diagnosed with a
“genetic abnormality or a potential for a genetic abnormality.”1 At the time that
H.B. 1305 was enacted, several other states had already enacted laws banning sexselective abortions as part of a larger trend of legislation banning abortion based on
the motive of the pregnant woman.2 North Dakota, however, is the first state to
single out women who seek to terminate a pregnancy because of a genetic anomaly,3
which has sparked a debate within the disability rights movement.4
This provision in North Dakota’s statute deserves special attention and analysis,
partly because it may become a model for other states, but also because it departs
from the traditional legislative approach to abortion. In the past, if the law has made
any distinction on the basis of fetal health it has made it easier, not harder, for a
woman to obtain an abortion in situations where there is evidence of fetal
impairment.5 This was true in the United States before Roe v. Wade was decided,6
1 H.B. 1305, 63d Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2, (N.D. 2013),
http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/63-2013/documents/13-0351-01000.pdf?20140813205421.
2 See BRIAN CITRO ET AL., REPLACING MYTHS WITH FACTS: SEX-SELECTIVE ABORTION
LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (Sujatha Jesudason et al. eds., 2014) (noting that eight states
have enacted laws prohibiting sex-selective abortion and that 21 states and the federal
government have considered such legislation since 2009); see also Justin Gillette, Pregnant
and Prejudiced: the Constitutionality of Sex- and Race-Selective Abortion Restrictions, 88
Wash. L. Rev. 645, 646 (2013).
3 See Eric Eckholm, Bill in North Dakota Bans Abortion After Heart Beat is Found, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 15, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/16/us/north-dakotaapproves-bill-to-ban-abortions-after-heartbeat-is-found.html?_r=0. Missouri also considered
legislation banning abortion on the ground of “genetic abnormality” but the bill failed to pass.
See H.B. 386, 97th Gen. Assemb.,1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013), available at
http://www.house.mo.gov/billsummary.aspx?bill=HB386&year=2013&code=R.
4 See Amy Julia Becker, North Dakota’s Ban Is a Bad Way to Stop Selective Abortion:
Culture as a Whole Needs to Change to be More Supportive of Children with Chromosomal
Conditions, THE ATLANTIC, Apr. 4, 2013, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/2013/04/north-dakotas-ban-is-a-bad-way-to-stopselective-abortion/274676/ (summarizing opposing views of the bill within the disability
rights movement); see also Alison Piepmeier, Outlawing Abortion Won’t Help Children with
Down Syndrome, Motherlode, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2013.
5

See WORLD HEALTH ORG., SAFE ABORTION: TECHNICAL AND POLICY GUIDANCE FOR
HEALTH SYSTEMS 93 (2d ed. 2012), available at
http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/publications/unsafe_abortion/9789241548434/en; see
also GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: AN OVERVIEW OF ABORTION LAWS (July 1, 2014),
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_OAL.pdf (noting exceptions
for “fetal abnormality” to restrictions on abortion or funding for abortion in the states of
Maryland, Mississippi, Virginia, and Utah).
6 See LINDA GREENHOUSE & REVA B. SIEGEL, BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT
SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING 272 (2012) (noting
that before Roe v. Wade was decided, the American Law Institute adopted a model statute that
would allow abortion in certain circumstances, including “grave physical or mental defect” of
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and it continues to be true in certain countries around the world that do not recognize
a general right to abortion but allow it in certain circumstances.7 Health
professionals also routinely counsel pregnant women to undergo prenatal diagnostic
testing, with the tacit understanding that she will likely elect to terminate the
pregnancy if testing reveals a fetal impairment.8 The underlying assumption – that it
is good public policy to permit, and perhaps even encourage, prospective parents to
prevent the birth of babies with disabilities – may seem self-evident to many people.
Yet it is a deeply painful subject within the disability rights movement.9 Thus, it is
not surprising that disability rights discourse is increasingly relied upon in
campaigns to restrict access to abortion in the United States, both in state legislative
debates10 and constitutional litigation.11
the fetus and that the majority of Americans supported allowing abortion in these
circumstances).
7

Ctr. for Reprod. Rights, Fact Sheet: The World’s Abortion Laws Map 2013 Update,

REPRODUCTIVERIGHTS.ORG,

http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/AbortionMap_Factsheet
_2013.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2014) (especially columns I and II, which indicate, with the
letter “F,” those countries that are considered to have restrictive abortion laws but do permit
abortion on the ground of fetal impairment) [hereinafter Ctr. for Reprod. Rights, Fact Sheet];
see also Reed Boland, Second Trimester Abortion Laws Globally: Actuality, Trends and
Recommendations, 2010 REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH MATTERS, NOV. 2010, at 67, 68 (reporting
that approximately sixty-nine countries specifically authorize abortions in the second trimester
on the ground of fetal impairment).
8 See generally Dov Fox & Christopher L. Griffin, Jr., Disability-Selective Abortion and
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 1009 UTAH L. REV. 845, 866 (2009).
9 See generally Marsha Saxton, Disability Rights and Selective Abortion, in ABORTION
WARS, A HALF CENTURY OF STRUGGLE 1950 TO 2000 374 (Rickie Solinger ed., 1998); Erik
Parens et al., The Disability Rights Critique of Prenatal Genetic Testing: Reflections and
Recommendations, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 1999, at s1 (Supp. 1999), available at
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2307/3527746/pdf; Adrienne Asch, Lawrence O. Gostin
& Diane M. Johnson, Respecting Persons with Disabilities and Preventing Disability: Is there
a Conflict?, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES: DIFFERENT
BUT EQUAL, 319–46 (Stanley S. Herr, Lawrence O. Gostin & Harold Hongju Koh, eds., 2003);
Steven A. Holmes, Abortion Issue Divides Advocates for Disabled, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1991.
10

See N.D. Legis. Branch Video, Senate Floor Session for HB 1305, ND.GOV (Mar. 15,
2013),
http://video.legis.nd.gov/pb3/powerbrowser_Desktop.aspx?ContentEntityId=228&date=20130
315&tnid=10&browser=0#agenda.
11

See Brief of Amici Curiae Jerome Lejune Foundation, USA, et al. in Support of
Petitioners, Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213 (2013) (No. 12-16670), available at
http://bdfund.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/FILED-AmicusLeJeuneSDiDSCBDF.pdf. The brief notes that most abortions conducted after 20 weeks are conducted because
prenatal testing revealed a fetal impairment and it argues that Arizona H.B. 2036 (2012)
therefore advanced a legitimate state interest of disfavoring disability-selective abortion by
prohibiting abortions after 20 weeks except in cases of medical emergency. Arizona’s law was
invalidated by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit because a state cannot, under
controlling precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court, prohibit a woman from terminating her
pregnancy prior to viability. Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2013, 1231), cert.
denied 134 S. Ct. 905 (2014); see also Adam Liptak & Fernanda Santos, Supreme Court
Won’t Hear Arizona Appeal on Abortion Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2014, available at
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This article argues that we should consider not only American constitutional
law12 but also comparative law and emerging international human rights norms, in
order to navigate the difficult issue of abortion on the basis of fetal impairment. The
United States is a State Party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR)13 and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).14 It is also a signatory (but not a full
State Party) to several other relevant treaties, including the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),15 the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),16 and the Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).17 The CRPD is particularly relevant because it
rejects the medical model of disability and embraces the social model, defining
disability as a form of social oppression.18 The CRPD also has numerous provisions
that are relevant to reproductive justice and the right to life. The U.S. Senate came
close to ratifying the CRPD in December 2012,19 falling just a few votes short of the
www.nytimes.com/2014/01/14/us/supreme-court-wont-hear-arizona-appeal-on-abortionban.html?_r=0 (providing press coverage of the U.S. Supreme Court’s refusal to hear the
appeal).
12

See generally Greer Donley, Does the Constitution Protect Abortions Based on Fetal
Anomaly?: Examining the Potential for Disability-Selective Abortion Bans in the Age of
Prenatal Whole Genome Sequencing, 20 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 291 (2013) (analyzing why a
proposed federal law prohibiting disability-selective abortion would be unconstitutional).
13 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force
23 Mar. 1976). Available at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx
[hereinafter “ICCPR”].
14 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, adopted Dec. 10,1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, UN GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51,
U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987). Available at:
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CAT.aspx [hereinafter “CAT”].
15 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted
Dec. 18, 1979, G.A. Res. 34/180, UN GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc.
A/34/46,1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981). Available at:
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CEDAW.aspx [hereinafter “CEDAW”].
16 Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25, annex,
UN GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989) (entered into force Sept. 2,
1990). Available at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CRC.aspx
[hereinafter “CRC”].
17

Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/106 (Jan. 24, 2007). Available at:
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/ConventionRightsPersonsWithDisabilities.
aspx [hereinafter “CRPD”].
18

See Arlene S. Kanter, The Promise and Challenge of the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 287 (2007);
Rosemary Kayees & Philip French, Out of Darkness Into Light? Introducing the Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 5 (2008).
19 Louis Jacobson, 38 Republicans vote against ratification, but treaty could still get
another vote next year, POLITIFACT (Dec. 4, 2012, 2:40 PM), http://www.politifact.com/trutho-meter/promises/obameter/promise/88/sign-the-un-convention-on-the-rights-of-persons-wi/.
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two-thirds majority that is required to ratify a treaty under the U.S. Constitution.20
In August 2014, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the CRPD
again,21 and the disability rights movement is hopeful that the full Senate will
eventually ratify the treaty.22 In any event, as a signatory to the treaty, the United
States is already obligated to “refrain from acts that would defeat the object and
purpose” of the treaty while preparing for ratification.23 This is a principle of
customary international law, codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.24
Part II of the article introduces North Dakota’s H.B. 1305 and explains why its
prohibition of abortion based upon a “genetic abnormality” is potentially more
significant than previous legislation purporting to prohibit only sex-selective
abortions. Part III considers the relationship between the history of eugenics and the
modern law of abortion, demonstrating why this is such a sensitive issue for people
who either live with disabilities themselves or have reared children with disabilities.
Part IV of the article analyzes the relationship between abortion and international
human rights law. This section begins by briefly summarizing the emerging
jurisprudence on access to abortion under human rights treaties other than the
CRPD. It then introduces the CRPD and its relevant provisions, summarizing the
drafting history of the articles that are particularly relevant to the rights to life, to
create a family, and to reproductive health services. This section then uses Spain and
Hungary as case studies to investigate the approach that the United Nations
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (the treaty-monitoring body for
the CRPD) has taken to the issue of abortion on the basis of fetal impairment, an
approach that has alarmed some advocates for women’s reproductive rights. Part V
concludes the article by suggesting public policy responses that would continue to
respect reproductive freedom while also addressing the history of eugenics and
discrimination against persons with disabilities.

20 Ironically, the small group of Senators who blocked U.S. ratification of the CRPD in
2012 often claim that the treaty is “pro-abortion,” although this is not the case. For discussion
of the failure of the United States to ratify the treaty in 2012, see Carole J. Petersen, The
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Using International Law to Promote
Social and Economic Development in the Asia Pacific, 35 U. HAW. L. REV. 821 (2013).
21

Mario Trujillo, Foreign relations committee approves disability treaty, THE HILL (July
22, 2014, 2:33 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/international/212991-foreign-relationscommittee-approves-disability-treaty.
22

See Press Release, Sen. Tom Harkin, Harkin Applauds Committee Approval of CRPD,
Urges Full Senate Consideration (July 22, 2014), available at
http://www.help.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/?id=6277e42e-7bf5-414e-8040b26c751dcdbf.
23
24

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 312(3) (1987).

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
The Vienna Convention was adopted and opened for signature in 1969 and entered into force
Jan. 27, 1980. Although the United States has not ratified the Vienna Convention, it does not
dispute that Article 18 reflects customary international law and therefore binds all nations.
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INTRODUCING NORTH DAKOTA’S H.B. 1305: WHY THE BAN ON
II.
DISABILITY-SELECTIVE ABORTION IS MORE SIGNIFICANT THAN PREVIOUS BANS ON
SEX-SELECTIVE ABORTION
H.B. 1305 is part of a package of legislation enacted in 2013 that made North
Dakota’s Abortion Control Act one of the most restrictive state laws in the United
States,25 and also set up a major challenge to Roe v. Wade.26 The North Dakota bill
that attracted the most public attention in 2013 was H.B. 1456, widely known as the
“heartbeat bill” because it purports to prohibit abortion as soon as a heartbeat is
detectable,27 which can be as early at six weeks.28 However, in the same year, the
North Dakota legislature also enacted S.B. 2305, which required physicians
performing abortions in the state to have admitting privileges at a hospital within 30
miles,29 and H.B. 1297, which prohibited doctors from administering certain drugs in
a protocol that many consider to be the standard of care for non-surgical abortions.30
25 Eric Eckholm, Judge Blocks North Dakota’s Abortion Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES, July 22,
2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/23/us/judge-blocks-north-dakotaabortion-restrictions.html.
26 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Since Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court case law
concerning the right to an abortion has consistently held that a woman has a constitutional
right to choose to terminate her pregnancy before the fetus is viable. While a state may
regulate the mode and manner of abortion prior to fetal viability, it may not proscribe a
woman from electing abortion or impose an undue burden on her choice.
27

See H.B. 1456, 63d Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013),
http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/63-2013/documents/13-0304-02000.pdf?20140813210157;
see also Cheryl Wetzstein, N.D. Bill Would Bar Most abortions if Heartbeat Found,
WASHINGTON TIMES, Mar. 17, 2013, available at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/mar/17/nd-bill-would-bar-most-abortions-ifheartbeat-foun/?page=all.
28

See H.B. 1456, 63d Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013),
http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/63-2013/documents/13-0304-02000.pdf?20140813210157;
see also MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Burdick, No. 1:13-CV-071, 2014 WL 1653201, *1, *15
(D.N.D. Apr. 16, 2014) (holding the “heartbeat” bill unconstitutional). The proponents knew
that the law would be held unconstitutional under Roe v. Wade and are hoping that the U.S.
Supreme Court will eventually hear an appeal and overrule or seriously limit Roe v. Wade. See
John Eligon & Erik Eckholm, New Laws Ban Most Abortions in North Dakota, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 26, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/27/us/north-dakota-governorsigns-strict-abortion-limits.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
29 See S.B. 2305, 63d Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013),
http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/63-2013/documents/13-0796-01000.pdf?20140813210437.
30 See H.B. 1297, 62d Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2011),
http://legis.nd.gov/assembly/62-2011/documents/11-0506-04000.pdf?20141002201500; and
Jessica Mason Pieklo, North Dakota Supreme Court Considers Whether There Is a State Right
to Abortion, RH REALITY CHECK (Dec. 12, 2013),
http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2013/12/12/north-dakota-supreme-court-considers-whether-astate-right-to-abortion-exists/; see also Heather D. Boonstra, Medication Abortion Restrictions
Burden Women and Providers—and Threaten U.S. Trend Toward Very Early Abortion, 16(1)
GUTTMACHER POLICY REVIEW (Winger 2013), pp. 18-21,
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/16/1/gpr160118.html (explaining how state laws,
including legislation enacted in North Dakota, seek to prevent abortion providers from
following the most advanced protocols for nonsurgical abortions).
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While supporters characterized these two bills as protecting women’s health, the
underlying goal was not to make abortion safer, but rather to make it more difficult
to obtain.31 Like the heartbeat bill, these two bills were drafted with the intention of
reducing the incidence of abortion generally in North Dakota, regardless of the
pregnant woman’s motivations for seeking to terminate the pregnancy.
All three of the bills mentioned above – H.B. 1297, S.B. 2305, and H.B. 1456 –
have been successfully challenged in the U.S. District Court for the District of North
Dakota.32 North Dakota appealed a permanent injunction of H.B. 1297 and a
temporary injunction of S.B. 2305.33 The state also appealed a judgment that H.B.
1456 (the heartbeat bill) is unconstitutional because it imposes an undue burden on a
woman seeking an abortion.34 As of July 2014, the state’s appeals were pending in
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Governor of North Dakota has made it
clear that he is prepared to allocate a significant amount of public money to defend
these three laws in court.35
Interestingly, although it was initially named in a test case, H.B. 1305 has not yet
been the subject of substantive judicial scrutiny.36 H.B. 1305 is different from the
other three bills that North Dakota enacted in 2013 because it does not seek to
restrict abortion generally. Rather, H.B. 1305 targets abortions requested for what
31 See, e.g., Ctr. for Reprod. Rights, Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (Mar. 5,
2009), http://reproductiverights.org/en/project/targeted-regulation-of-abortion-providers-trap
(critiquing abortion legislation that has the effect of making abortions more difficult to obtain
and more risky for women).
32

MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Burdick, No. 09-2011-CV-02205 (E. Cent. Dist. Ct. N.D. July 15,
2013), available at http://rhrealitycheck.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/07/2013-07-15_MKBvBurdick_Perm_Injunction.pdf (Memorandum
Opinion and Order For Permanent Injunction). MKB originally challenged a 2011 amendment
from HB 1297 pertaining to restrictions on medication for abortions on February 2012;
however, the plaintiffs amended their complaint in May 2013 and were permitted to
supplement an additional challenge for SB 2305 with their complaint. Nat’l P’ship Women &
Families, In the News: MKB Management Corp. v. Burdick, REPRO HEALTH WATCH, available
at http://go.nationalpartnership.org/site/News2?id=34416 (last visited Oct.11, 2014).
33

Id. The state agreed (in a negotiated settlement) that the clinic’s doctors can maintain
admitting privileges as long as the law requires them to do so; however, if the clinic’s
admitting privileges are ever revoked or not renewed, the clinic may file a new lawsuit
challenging S.B. 2305. Id.
34 MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Burdick, No. 1:13-CV-071, 2014 WL 1653201, *1, *10 (D.N.D.
Apr. 16, 2014).
35 James MacPherson, North Dakota Gov. Jack Dalrymple Approves 6-week Abortion
Ban, WASHINGTON TIMES, Mar. 26, 2013, available at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/mar/26/north-dakota-gov-jack-dalrympleapproves-6-week-ab/.
36 As explained below, H.B. 1305 was initially challenged in the same lawsuit that
challenged the heartbeat bill but the plaintiffs apparently reconsidered as they asked the court
to dismiss the claims regarding H.B. 1305 early in the litigation. Jessica Mason Pieklo, Red
River Clinic Asks Court to Dismiss Its Legal Challenge to Sex-Selection and Fetal Anomaly
Bans, RH REALITY CHECK (Sept. 12, 2013, 1:04 PM),
http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2013/09/12/red-river-clinic-asks-court-to-dismiss-its-legalchallenge-to-sex-and-fetal-anomaly-bans/.
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the legislature deemed to be particularly bad motivations – the desire to practice sex
selection or to prevent the birth of a child with a genetic disorder.37 H.B. 1305 made
amendments to the definitions in North Dakota’s Abortion Control Act38 and added a
new section prohibiting abortion – at any time during the pregnancy – if the doctor
knows that the pregnant woman is terminating the pregnancy solely because of the
sex of the fetus or because the fetus “has been diagnosed with either a genetic
abnormality, or a potential for a genetic abnormality.”39 Supporters of H.B. 1305
argued that this provision serves an essential public interest by affirming North
Dakota’s policy of prohibiting gender and disability discrimination.40 Although
grouped together in the same section of H.B. 1305, the two prohibitions must be
analyzed separately in order to understand their potential impact on pregnant women
and the doctors who serve them.
H.B. 1305’s prohibition on abortion for the purpose of sex selection is not
ground-breaking, but rather is similar to laws that have been adopted in seven other
states: Illinois, Pennsylvania, Arizona, Kansas, North Carolina, South Dakota, and
Oklahoma.41 Arizona further prohibits abortion on the ground of the race of the
fetus,42 something that has also been attempted at the federal level by members of the
U.S. Congress.43 Supporters of this type of legislation have invariably invoked the
discourse of equality and nondiscrimination, portraying the legislation as protecting
the civil rights of vulnerable groups.44 While there is no doubt that the anti-abortion
movement genuinely deplores the practice of sex-selective abortion, it appears that
the movement also views the phenomena of sex selection as something that can be
exploited, part of a broader strategy to dampen women’s support for Roe v Wade.45
To quote Steven Mosher, who was at that time the President of the Population
Research Institute, an American anti-abortion organization:
Banning sex-selective abortion will force supporters of abortion to
publicly address a question that they will find profoundly disturbing: Is
the right to abortion a license to destroy children for any and all reasons,
including that of their sex? Most people of moderate persuasion, even
37

H.B. 1305, 63d Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2 (N.D. 2013), available at
http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/63-2013/documents/13-0351-01000.pdf?20140813205421.
38

N.D. CENTURY CODE § 14-02.1-02 (2013).

39

N.D. CENTURY CODE § 14-02.01-04.1 (2013).

40

Relating to the Prohibition on Abortions for Sex Selection or Genetic Abnormalities,
Definitions and Provide a Penalty on H.B. 1305 Before the Hon. Comm. on Human Services,
63d Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 22 (N.D. 2013) (statement of Rep. Bette Grande).
41

See CITRO ET AL., supra note 2, at 29–30.

42

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02 (2011) (West).

43 See Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act of 2012, H.R. 3541, 112th Cong. (2012); Prenatal
Non-Discrimination Act (PRENDA) of 2013, H.R. 447, 113th Cong. (2013) (as referred to H.
Comm. on the Judiciary).
44
45

See H.R. 447, 113th Cong. (2013).

See Steven W. Mosher, President’s Page: Let’s Ban Sex Selective Abortions, 7 PRI
REVIEW (Mar./Apr. 2007), http://pop.org/content/presidents-page-let-us-ban-sex-selective1340.
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those inclined to be “pro-choice,” will agree that the right of the unborn
child to life should not depend on whether she (or he) possesses the
requisite genitalia. Even those who believe in the absolute right to destroy
the child under any and all circumstances, it is safe to predict, will be
uncomfortable defending such an extreme position. This sense of
contradiction will be further heightened among radical feminists, the
shock troops of the abortion movement. They may believe that the right to
abortion is fundamental to women’s emancipation, but many will recoil at
the thought of aborting their unborn sisters in disproportionate numbers.
How can they, who so oppose patriarchy and discrimination on the basis
of sex, consent to the ultimate form of patriarchy and discrimination,
namely, the elimination of baby girls solely on account of their sex?
Many will be silent, while others will defend abortion with less
conviction.46
Mosher also predicted that pro-choice advocates would be left “stammering and
stuttering” because they would unable to respond to the moral and public policy
arguments against permitting sex-selective abortions.47
Mosher’s predictions proved to be somewhat exaggerated. It is, of course, deeply
disturbing for feminists to consider that reproductive freedom will be used, at certain
times and in certain places, to prevent female births.48 Public opinion polls also
indicate that a majority of the American public disapproves of abortion when sought
for this purpose.49 However, it does not appear that Mosher’s strategy of proposing
state legislation to prohibit sex-selective abortion has made large numbers of
feminists less willing to defend the right to abortion under American constitutional
law.50 Nor has the issue divided the American feminist movement in the way that
some other contentious issues (such as laws prohibiting commercial sex or
pornography) have divided the movement. Many of the organizations fighting for
reproductive rights have gradually broadened their focus to include issues of
reproductive justice, rather than focusing only on abortion.51 Nonetheless, in general,
46

Id.

47

Steven W. Mosher, A New Front in the Abortion Wars: PreNDA Seeks Race and Sexbased Equality for the Unborn, 18 PRI REVIEW (Nov./Dec. 2008), http://pop.org/content/anew-front-in-abortion-wars-prenda-seeks-1602.
48

See, e.g., April Cherry, A Feminist Understanding of Sex-Selective Abortion: Solely a
Matter of Choice?, 10 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 161 (1995) (analyzing the limits of choice as a
value in the context of sex-selective abortion).
49 See, e.g., Charlotte Lozier Inst., Poll: 77% of Americans Support Ban on Sex-Selective
Abortion, CLI PRESS RELEASES (May 17, 2012), http://www.lozierinstitute.org/newsroom/press-releases/ (announcing results of public opinion poll of 1,016 adults).
50 See, e.g., Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr., Even More than Abortion: the Constitutional
Importance of Roe v. Wade and the Right to Privacy, NWLC.ORG (Jan. 18, 2013),
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/even_more_than_abortion_factsheet_1-18-13.pdf.
51

One such organization is “The Center on Reproductive Rights and Justice,” a social
justice research center that stresses the importance of (1) the right to have a child; (2) the
right not to have a child; and (3) the right to parent children. UC Berkeley Sch. of Law,
Purpose: Mission Section, BERKELYLAW, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/14379.htm
(emphasizing the importance of people having the social, financial, political, and legal
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American feminist organizations continue to defend Roe v. Wade,52 and feminists
believe that access to abortion is an essential component of women’s right to
equality and bodily integrity.53
Pro-choice organizations also argue that instead of prohibiting abortion, the most
effective way to discourage sex selection is to adopt laws and policies that improve
the status of women in society, so that prospective parents will value male and
female babies equally.54 The World Health Organization and other international
agencies that have studied the problems of son preference and sex selection share
this view.55 Additionally, recent research confirms that sex-selective abortion is far
less common in the United States than has been portrayed by the anti-abortion
movement.56 This makes it easier for pro-choice feminists to dismiss the campaign to
prohibit sex-selective abortion in the United States as the classic “red herring,” a

conditions required to make genuine choices about reproduction); see also Ctr. For Reprod.
Rights, Our Issues, REPRODUCTIVERIGHTS.ORG, http://reproductiverights.org/en/our-issues (last
visited Sept. 25, 2014) (listing access to abortion along with access to publicly funded health
care to help women have safe and healthy pregnancies). The Center for Reproductive Rights
also campaigns against forced sterilization. See, e.g., Ctr. For Reprod. Rights, Czech
Government Apologizes to Victims of Forced Sterilization, REPRODUCTIVERIGHTS.ORG (Nov.
25, 2009), http://reproductiverights.org/en/press-room/czech-government-apologizes-tovictims-of-forced-sterilization (reporting on a successful joint advocacy project of the Center
for Reproductive Rights and Poradna, a Slovakian organization).
52

See, e.g., Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr., supra note 50.

53 See Terri Susan Fine, Generations, Feminist Beliefs and Abortion Rights Support, J.
INT’L WOMEN’S STUD., May 2006, at 126, available at
http://vc.bridgew.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1465&context=jiws.
54 See, e.g., Ctr. For Reprod. Rights, Statement of Policies and Principles on
Discrimination Against Women and Sex-Selective Abortion Bans, REPRODUCTIVERIGHTS.ORG,
http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/Statement%20on%20Se
x%20Selective%20Abortion%20Bans%20FIN_1.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2014); Ctr. For
Reprod. Rights, U.S. House to Vote on Unconstitutional Abortion Ban,
REPRODUCTIVERIGHTS.ORG (May 30, 2012), http://reproductiverights.org/en/press-room/ushouse-to-vote-on-unconstitutional-federal-abortion-ban.
55

WORLD HEALTH ORG. ET AL., PREVENTING GENDER-BIASED SEX SELECTION: AN
INTERAGENCY STATEMENT, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 10 (2011), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Women/WRGS/PreventingGenderBiasedSexSelectio
n.pdf (recommending systemic changes to reduce son preference but also cautioning that
efforts to manage or limit sex selection should also not hamper or limit access to safe abortion
services).
56

Anti-abortion legislators tend to rely upon reports that more male than female babies are
born in certain communities; however these statistics do not necessarily document sexselective abortion because prospective parents can influence the sex of their future child
through other prenatal methods. For example, they can use artificial insemination and “sperm
sorting,” whereby only sperm that will produce the desired sex are allowed to fertilize the egg. Sex
selection can also be achieved through pre-implantation genetic diagnosis: eggs are removed from
a woman, fertilized outside of her body, and only the embryos of the desired sex are implanted in
the uterus. These sex selection procedures are legal and provided by fertility clinics in the United
States. See CITRO ET AL., supra note 2, at 7.
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misuse of the discourse of equality, and a distraction from the more fundamental
debate on access to reproductive health services.57
On the other hand, pro-choice organizations do not appear particularly eager to
challenge the state laws that prohibit sex-selective abortion.58 While this decision
may arise from a need to conserve limited litigation funds, it may also reflect a
desire to avoid being seen as publicly defending a right to practice sex selection in a
country that clearly disapproves of it. As of this writing, constitutional challenges
were being mounted against only two of the eight states with laws banning sexselective abortions – Illinois59 and Arizona.60 In North Dakota, the lawsuit that
successfully challenged the “heartbeat bill” originally included a challenge to H.B.
1305.61 However, the plaintiffs subsequently requested a motion for dismissal of the
claims regarding H.B. 1305, which was granted.62 As an explanation for its decision,
an attorney for the Center for Reproductive Rights stated that it was unclear whether
H.B. 1305 would have a “direct impact on women seeking abortion services at the
Red River Women’s Clinic at this time.”63 The Red River Women’s Clinic also
57

The National Asian Pacific American Women’s Forum launched a petition against the
South Dakota ban on sex-selective abortion, arguing that such bans also perpetuate negative
stereotypes about Asian Americans. See Nat’l Asian Pacific Am. Women’s Forum, Race and
Sex Selective Abortion Bans: Don’t Let South Dakota Pass a Racist, Anti-immigrant Abortion
Ban!, NAPAWF, http://napawf.org/programs/reproductive-justice-2/sex-selection/race-andsex-selective-abortion-bans/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2014).
58

See, e.g., Joshua D. Lee, Racializing Abortion: Standing and the Equal Protection
Challenge to Sex-Selective Abortion Statutes, NYU J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y QUORUM (July 10,
2014), available at http://www.nyujlpp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Lee-2014-nyujlppquorum-63.pdf..
59

On March 30, 1993, the U.S. District Court for the N.D. of Illinois issued a consent
decree that enjoined enforcement of Illinois’ ban on sex-selective abortions for pre-viability
abortions. See Herbst v. O’Malley, No. 84 C 5602, 1993 WL 59142, at *1–4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2,
1993).
60 On May 2013, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), on behalf of NAPA WF
and the National Association for the advancement of Colored People (NAACP) for Mariocopa
County, brought a lawsuit against the Arizona Attorney General, the Arizona Medical Board,
and the Executive Director of the Arizona Medical Board. The plaintiffs alleged that the Act
violates the 14th Amendment because it denies equal protection by perpetuating racially
discriminatory stereotypes of Black and Asian-Pacific women, as well as the Asian culture.
The U.S. District Court held that the plaintiffs failed to identify any personal injury suffered
by them as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error and the defendant’s motion to
dismiss [12(b)(1)] was granted on Oct. 3, 2013. The plaintiffs appealed the decision and it is
currently pending in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See NAACP v. Horne, No. CV1301079-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 5519514, at *1 (D. Ariz. Oct. 2, 2013).
61 See Press Release, Ctr. for Reprod. Rights, Center for Reproductive Rights Files
Lawsuit in North Dakota to Block Nation’s Earliest and Most Extreme Abortion Ban (June 25,
2013), available at http://reproductiverights.org/en/press-room/center-for-reproductiverights-files-lawsuit-in-north-dakota-to-block-most-extreme-ban.
62
63

See MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Burdick, 954 F. Supp. 2d 900, 902 (D.N.D. 2013).

See James MacPhearson, Judge Dismisses Part of N. Dakota Abortion Lawsuit,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 11, 2013, 3:50 PM), available at
http://abcnews.go.com/m/story?id=20227777&sid=81.
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maintained that H.B. 1305 would not affect it because it does not conduct abortions
based on genetic abnormalities or the sex of the fetus.64
These statements made on behalf of the Red River Women’s Clinic are probably
accurate with respect to the clause in H.B. 1305 prohibiting sex-selective abortions.65
In fact, as opponents of North Dakota’s H.B. 1305 pointed out during the legislative
debates, there is no record of any abortions in North Dakota being conducted solely
for the purpose of sex selection.66 Moreover, even if an abortion was sought for the
purposes of sex selection, a woman living in North Dakota would probably keep
silent about her motive, partly out of embarrassment, but also because she might
anticipate that the doctor would have ethical problems with a sex-selective
abortion.67 H.B. 1305 does not require the doctor to ask about a woman’s
motivations for requesting an abortion.68 Thus, even if it could be enforced, it is
unlikely that North Dakota’s ban on sex-selective abortion would have any
significant impact on abortion providers or on women seeking abortions in the state.
However, the same cannot be said of the other main provision in H.B. 1305,
which prohibits doctors from performing abortions when they are aware that the
abortion has been requested because of a “genetic abnormality or a potential for a
genetic abnormality.”69 Unlike sex-selective abortion, a decision to terminate a
pregnancy on the basis of fetal disability is widely viewed as an acceptable choice in
the United States.70 For example, one survey of 1,082 pregnant women found that
three-quarters would consider having an abortion if they knew that their infant would
be affected by a chromosomal abnormality, 71 while only one-quarter would do so
64 See Steven Ertelt, Judge’s Ruling Makes North Dakota First to Ban Abortions Based on
Down Syndrome, LIFE NEWS (Sept 12, 2013, 12:37 PM),
http://www.lifenews.com/2013/09/12/judges-ruling-makes-north-dakota-first-to-banabortions-based-on-down-syndrome/.
65 See CITRO ET AL., supra note 2, at 6 (showing examples of how anti-choice legislators
have exaggerated the incidence of sex-selective abortion in the United States).
66 See N.D. Legis. Branch Video, Senate Floor Session for HB 1305 ND.GOV (Mar. 15,
2013),
http://video.legis.nd.gov/pb3/powerbrowser_Desktop.aspx?ContentEntityId=228&date=20130
315&tnid=10&browser=0#agenda.
67

See, e.g., ACOG Committee Opinion No. 360, Sex Selection, AMERICAN COLLEGE OF
OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS (2007), available at http://www.acog.org/ResourcesAnd-Publications/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-Ethics/Sex-Selection. Interestingly, the
Opinion makes an explicit exception for sex selection when it is pursued to prevent the birth
of a child with a hereditary disease.
68 H.B. 1305, 63d Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2 (N.D. 2013), available at
http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/63-2013/documents/13-0351-01000.pdf?20140813205421.
69

Id.

70 See, e.g., Amy Harmon, Genetic Testing + Abortion = ???, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2007,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/13/weekinreview/13harm.html?_r=0 (reporting
that public opinion polls indicate that 70% of Americans believe that abortion should be legal
in situations of fetal impairment).
71

See D. Hollander, In Certain Circumstances, Women in Prenatal Care Would Not Rule
Out Having an Abortion in the Future, 37 PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL & REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH 4, GUTTMACHER INST. (Dec. 2005), available at
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because of financial hardship.72 It is very common for pregnant women receiving a
diagnosis of fetal impairment to elect to terminate the pregnancy.73 For example,
recent studies of Down’s syndrome, which is one of the most frequently occurring
genetic anomalies,74 have reported a pregnancy termination rate between 67% and
85% in the United States.75 An international review published in 1999 reported an
even higher rate of termination (92%) following prenatal diagnosis of Down’s
syndrome.76 Supporters of North Dakota’s H.B. 1305 emphasized these statistics
during the legislative debate on the bill, arguing that fetuses with genetic anomalies
are being “disproportionately targeted in the womb.”77
Of course, abortions sought after women receive a diagnosis of genetic disorder
still represent a minority of all abortions in the United States (because most
abortions are sought by women who do not want to be pregnant).78 But, there is no
denying that disability-selective abortion is much more common than sex-selective
abortion in the United States.79 Moreover, a woman who terminates a pregnancy due
to a genetic anomaly generally makes that decision after discussing the prenatal test
results with one or more doctors.80 Thus, her medical records may contain records of
the prenatal tests and any counseling she received, making it easier for a doctor to
ascertain her motive for seeking an abortion. Indeed, it would not be unusual for a
pregnant woman in this situation to express deep sadness regarding the prenatal test

https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/3720305b.html (citing Learman LA et al., Abortion
Attitudes of Pregnant Women in Prenatal Care, 192 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1939,
1939–47 (2005) (describing results of a sample of over a thousand pregnant women)).
72

Id.

73 See, e.g., Kenneth B. Schechtman et al., Decision-Making for Termination of
Pregnancies with Fetal Anomalies: Analysis of 53,000 Pregnancies, 99 OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 216, 216 (Feb. 2002).
74 See Jaime L. Natoli et al., Prenatal Diagnosis of Down Syndrome: a Systematic Review
of Termination Rates (1995–2011), 32 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 142, 142 (2012) available at
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/pd.2910/full.
75

Id. at 144.

76

See Caroline Mansfield et al., Termination Rates After Prenatal Diagnosis of Down
Syndrome, Spina Bifida, Anencephaly, and Turner and Klinefelter Syndromes: A Systematic
Literature Review, 19 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 9, 808–12 (1999) available at
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/enhanced /doi/10.1002/%28SICI%2910970223%28199909%2919:9%3C808::AID-PD637%3E3.0.CO;2-B/ (reporting a termination rate
of 92%).
77

Hearing on H.B. 1305 Before the Hon. Comm. on Human Services, 63d Legis.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013) (testimony of Rep. Bette Grande).
78 See, e.g., Gudrum Schultz, The Real Reason Women Choose Abortion,
ACTIONLIFE.ORG, http://www.actionlife.org/index.php/life-issues/abortion/item/124-the-realreason-women-choose-abortion (last visited Oct. 3, 2014).
79
80

Schechtman et al., supra note 73, at 216; Cherry, supra note 48, at 161.

See generally Genetics Home Reference, Genetics Consultation, GHR.NLM.NIH.GOV,
http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/handbook/consult?show=all (last visited Oct. 3, 2014) (explaining
prenatal genetic testing).
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results at the very time that she requests the abortion.81 Thus, the doctor who
ultimately performs the abortion could easily become aware (either directly from
something that the woman says or indirectly from her medical records) that a
diagnosed genetic anomaly was the motivation for seeking an abortion. According
to the terms of North Dakota’s H.B. 1305, the doctor would then have a legal
obligation to refuse to perform the abortion.82
It should be noted that H.B. 1305 makes no exceptions, not even for fetal
impairments that will certainly result in death, either late in pregnancy or shortly
after birth.83 Legislators who opposed H.B. 1305 pointed this out and objected
strongly to the concept that a woman should be obligated to undergo a full-term
pregnancy and childbirth after her doctor has medically determined that the fetus is
likely to die within days of birth.84 Nonetheless, no exceptions were written into the
statute.
While North Dakota was the first state to ban disability-selective abortions, it
may not be the last. Prenatal testing is rapidly becoming more sophisticated,
allowing pregnant women to obtain genetic information earlier in pregnancy through
non-invasive blood tests.85 This may increase the incidence of prenatal genetic
testing and, as a result, disability-selective abortion.86 It may also create an incentive
for state legislators who oppose abortion to enact laws in other states, patterned after
H.B. 1305.87 This kind of legislation could have serious implications for women and
their families, as well as those who provide abortion services.
Given the potential impact, pro-choice organizations may feel compelled to
challenge state laws that prohibit disability-selective abortion. The next section
explains why a challenge to North Dakota’s H.B. 1305 would likely generate strong
feelings within the disability rights movement.

81

See, e.g., ELIZABETH RING-CASSIDY & IAN GENTLES, WOMEN’S HEALTH AFTER
ABORTION: THE MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE 159 (2d ed. 2003).
82 See H.B. 1305, 63d Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2 (N.D. 2013), available at
http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/63-2013/documents/13-0351-01000.pdf?20140813205421.
83

Id.

84 See N.D. Legis. Branch Video, Senate Floor Session for HB 1305, ND.GOV (Mar. 15,
2013),
http://video.legis.nd.gov/pb3/powerbrowser_Desktop.aspx?ContentEntityId=228&date=20130
315&tnid=10&browser=0#agenda.
85 See Victorian Clinical Genetic Servs., Non-Invasive Prenatal Screening, VCGS,
available at
http://www.vcgs.org.au/clinical/Documents/PDF/VCGS_PanoramaTest_Brochure.pdf (last
visited Oct. 12, 2014).
86 See Rachel Rebouche & Karen Rothenberg, Mixed Messages: The Intersection of
Prenatal Genetic Testing and Abortion, 55 HOW. L.J. 983, 987 (2012) (suggesting that
termination of pregnancy due to fetal impairment will become a focal point of public policy
debates on abortion as prenatal testing becomes more cost-effective and routine).
87

See, e.g., Americans United for Life, Order Model Legislation, available at
http://www.aul.org/legislative-resources/order-model-legislation/ (last visited July 10, 2014)
(demonstrating how it is relatively easy for legislators to obtain a template for a variety of
bills restricting access to abortion).
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THE HISTORY OF EUGENICS AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE MODERN LAW
AND PRACTICE OF ABORTION

Eugenics represents a particularly tragic chapter in the history of discrimination
against persons with disabilities. The term “eugenic” (derived from the Greek word
for “well born”) was originally coined by Francis Galton, who was a cousin of
Charles Darwin and one of the founders of the English Eugenics Education
Society.88 While commonly associated with the extreme racist ideology of Nazi
Germany, eugenic theories were actually embraced before and after World War II,
and were endorsed by people from a variety of different social backgrounds, political
convictions, and national affiliations.89 Indeed, eugenic theories were openly
promoted in the United States during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and
inspired a number of states to enact laws preventing persons with disabilities from
marrying and reproducing.90 The language used in one Connecticut state statute was
typical; it prohibited “epileptics, imbeciles, and feebleminded persons” from
marrying or having extramarital sexual relations before the age of forty-five.91 Many
state legislatures also enacted laws allowing for “eugenic sterilization,” which
eventually led to the sterilization of approximately 60,000 Americans.92 When
Virginia’s sterilization law was challenged in court, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
it in 1927 in the famous case of Buck v. Bell, in which Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes proclaimed, “[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough.”93 It was not until
1942 that the Supreme Court declared, in Skinner v. Oklahoma, that procreation is a
fundamental right and thus a statute restricting it must be subjected to the “strict
scrutiny” standard of constitutional review.94
Eugenic theories were also influential in Canada. For example, the provinces of
Alberta and British Columbia imposed sterilization as a condition for discharging
inmates from psychiatric institutions based on the assumption that it would not be

88 Ruth Hubbard, Abortion and Disability: Who Should and Who Should Not Inherit the
World?, in THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER 75, 75 (Lennard J. Davis ed., 4th ed. 2013).
89 See generally Frank Dikotter, Race Culture: Recent Perspectives on the History of
Eugenics, 103(2) THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW, Apr. 1998, at 467, 467 available at
http://www.frankdikotter.com/publications/race_culture_1.pdf (noting that eugenics was
embraced by social reformers, intellectuals, and medical authorities from one end of the
political spectrum to the other).
90

See generally PAUL LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, NO IMBECILES: EUGENICS, THE
SUPREME COURT, AND BUCK V. BELL 45 (2008).
91 Robert J. Cynkar, C o m m e n t , Buck v. Bell: ‘Felt Necessities’ v. Fundamental
Values?, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1418, 1432 (1981).
92 See Michael G. Silver, Note, Eugenics and Compulsory Sterilization Laws: Providing
Redress for the Victims of a Shameful Era in United States History, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
862, 862–63 (2004).
93
94

Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).

Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that compulsory sterilization
could not be imposed as a punishment for a crime, on the ground that the relevant Oklahoma
law excluded white-collar crimes from carrying sterilization penalties).
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safe to discharge a patient unless the “danger of procreation” could be eliminated.95
Compulsory sterilization was also practiced in a range of countries across Europe,
Scandinavia, and South America.96 In China, eugenic theories were embraced during
the Republican period and also under the Communist Party.97
Many people assume that compulsory sterilization has now been eradicated, at
least in civilized nations that purport to comply with international human rights
norms.98 In reality, persons with disabilities (particularly women and girls) continue
to be sterilized in many parts of the world.99 Moreover, the question of whether
sterilization is ethical continues to be debated by governments, lawyers, doctors, and
family members, who often argue that sterilization is in the “best interests” of an
individual living with a disability.100
Interestingly, in Australia, a recent
parliamentary inquiry documented many abuses associated with the practice but
nonetheless stopped short of recommending a complete ban on the practice of
sterilizing a person because of a disability.101
In light of this history, it is important for society to consider whether, and under
what circumstances, the modern law of abortion may represent a form of eugenics. It
would be uncontroversial to categorize a law as “eugenic” if it required pregnant
women to undergo prenatal testing and to terminate a pregnancy where there is
evidence of a fetal impairment.102 However, no state in the United States would enact
such a law today; moreover, if any state did so, the law would certainly be found
unconstitutional.103 The more relevant and complex question is whether society
95 See Kristen Savel, Sex and the Sacred: Sterilisation and Bodily Integrity in English
and Canadian Law, 49 MCGILL L.J. 1093, 1114 (2004) (citing the Sexual Sterilisation Acts of
Alberta and British Columbia, enacted in 1928 and 1933, respectively).
96

See Dikotter, supra note 89, at 468.

97

See generally FRANK DIKOTTER, IMPERFECT CONCEPTIONS: MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE,
BIRTH DEFECTS AND EUGENICS IN CHINA 105 (1998); see also Carole J. Petersen, Population
Policy and Eugenic Theory: Implications of China’s Ratification of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 8 CHINA: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
85, 95 (2010).
98 See Against Her Will: Forced and Coerced Sterilization of Women Worldwide, OPEN
SOC’Y FOUNDATIONS (Oct. 4, 2011), available at
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/publications/against-her-will-forced-and-coercedsterilization-women-worldwide.
99

Id.

100 See Sterilization of Women and Girls with Disabilities: A Briefing Paper, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/11/10/sterilization-womenand-girls-disabilities.
101 See Parliament of Austl., Special Inquiry: The Involuntary or Coerced Sterilisation of
People with Disabilities in Australia,
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Community_Affairs/Invo
luntary_Sterilisation (last visited Aug. 1, 2014).
102 See Jon Entine, DNA Screening is Part of the New Eugenics – and that’s Okay, GENETIC
LITERACY PROJECT (July 8, 2013), http://www.geneticliteracyproject.org/2013/07/08/dnascreening-is-part-of-the-new-eugenics-and-thats-okay/.
103 See Against Her Will: Forced and Coerced Sterilization of Women Worldwide, supra
note 98.
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pursues eugenics when it makes prenatal testing readily available and then allows
each woman to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy if she receives a diagnosis
of fetal impairment. In that case, the decision to abort does not necessarily reflect a
societal policy of trying to prevent the birth of persons with disabilities. Rather, it
might reflect compassion for the pregnant woman, respect for her right to physical
autonomy, or recognition that she is in the best position to determine whether she
should continue the pregnancy.
However, many disability rights scholars and activists would argue that society
does not simply allow pregnant women to make their own decisions.104 Instead, the
medical profession and other powerful institutions actively encourage disabilityselective abortion by recommending genetic screening and prenatal testing and then
counseling prospective parents in a manner that discourages them from continuing a
pregnancy if the tests reveal fetal impairment.105 In 2007, the American College of
Obstetrics and Gynecology amended its guidelines to recommend that all pregnant
women (rather than just women over the age of 35) should be offered prenatal
chromosomal screening and, if warranted by the screening, prenatal diagnostic
testing.106 In doing so, this professional body has arguably helped to expand and
“normalize” the termination of pregnancies with genetic anomalies.107 Officially, the
purpose of expanding genetic screening and prenatal testing is not to pressure
pregnant women or even to suggest that they should have an abortion after receiving
a diagnosis of fetal impairment.108 Rather, the stated purpose is simply to “prepare”
prospective parents for the possibility that the child will have a disability and allow
women to make informed choices.109 But as there is no “cure” for chromosomal
disorders, the unspoken message is always there: by recommending screening and/or
testing, the doctors are providing prospective parents an opportunity to abort a fetus
deemed to be genetically imperfect.110 From the perspective of disability rights
activists, the inevitable discursive effect of these targeted screening programs is to
“convey the devaluation of the lives of persons with disabilities.”111
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Newspaper Framing, 32 DISABILITY STUD. QUARTERLY (2012), available at http://dsqsds.org/article/view/1767/3096.
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REHABILITATION (2012), available at http://www.ijdcr.ca/VOL12_02/articles/lord.shtml; see
also Adreinne Asch, Disability Equality and Prenatal Testing: Contradictory or Compatible?
30 FLA ST. U. L. REV. 315, 315–16 (2003).
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The medical profession’s tacit support of disability-selective abortion is also
evident in the Opinion of the Ethics Committee of the American College of
Obstetrics and Gynecology, which provides that it is generally unethical for a doctor
to facilitate sex selection except where the purpose is to prevent the birth of a child
with a sex-linked hereditary disease.112 In other words, helping prospective parents
to prevent the birth of a girl is inherently unethical, while helping parents to prevent
the birth of child with a disability is perfectly ethical. Many doctors would not see
the potential for discrimination in this position because they have traditionally
adopted a medical view of disability and impairment.113 As one commentator stated
in 1999:
When physicians, public health experts, and bioethicists promote prenatal
diagnosis to prevent future disability, they let disability become the only
relevant characteristic and suggest that it is such a problematic
characteristic that people eagerly awaiting a new baby should terminate
the pregnancy and “try again” for a healthy child. Professionals fail to
recognize that along with whatever impairment may be diagnosed come
all the characteristics of any other future child. The health professions
suggest that once a prospective parent knows of the likely disability of a
future child, there is nothing else to know or imagine about who the child
might become: disability subverts parental dreams.114
This purely medical approach to disability is evident in the “quality of life”
assessments given to pregnant women when they receive a diagnosis of fetal
impairment. Traditionally, these assessments are provided by doctors, who may pass
on harmful stereotypes to prospective parents regarding the expected quality of life
of a child with a disability.115 This is not to suggest that parents should not have
access to medical information. Certain impairments cause significant physical pain
and suffering, and prospective parents have a right to know this.116 However,
doctors are not experts on the overall quality of life of persons living with
disabilities.117 Rather, individuals living with the impairment, or their families, are
better qualified to offer an opinion on the expected quality of life of a future child.118
112 Sex Selection, ACOG Committee Opinion No. 360, American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists (2011), available at http://www.acog.org/Resources-AndPublications/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-Ethics/Sex-Selection.
113

See Adreinne Asch, Prenatal Diagnosis and Selective Abortion: A Challenge to
Practice and Policy, 89 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 1649, 1652 (1999), as cited in Carol Bishop
Mills, Prenatal Testing, Disability, and Termination: An Examination of Newspaper Framing,
32 DISABILITY STUDIES QUARTERLY (2012), available at http://dsqsds.org/article/view/1767/3096.
114
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116 Ellen Painter Dollar, Why Prenatal Screening for Gender and For Disabilities Are Not
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In recent decades, the United States has enacted extensive legislation to promote
the rights of persons with disabilities, including the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA)119 and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).120 One might
hope that these laws (and the disability rights movement generally) would help to
counter the purely medical view of disability, giving doctors and prospective parents
a less negative view of the prospect of raising a child with an impairment. In theory,
laws that prohibit disability discrimination and require inclusive education should
enhance the expected quality of life of children with disabilities and, thus, increase
the likelihood that a woman would decide to continue her pregnancy after receiving
a diagnosis of fetal impairment.121 However, a 2012 study of the portrayal of
prenatal testing in American newspapers concluded that disability is still portrayed
primarily as a negative quality and that termination of a fetus with an impairment is
often presented as “a matter of fact issue, with little regard to the controversy that
might be embedded in such a position.”122
This may indicate that laws prohibiting disability discrimination have failed to
fundamentally change society’s view of disability or to reassure prospective parents
that a child born with an impairment can have a high quality of life. Indeed, one
theory is that laws prohibiting disability discrimination may have done the opposite
by bringing more public attention to the discrimination that is still prevalent in
society and the challenges that parents will face when rearing children with
disabilities.123 For example, it is well known that many parents are dissatisfied with
public schools’ compliance with the IDEA legislation and have felt compelled to file
complaints, spawning a good deal of litigation and an entire specialty within the field
of alternative dispute resolution.124
119 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (amended 2009).
The ADA was amended by the Americans with Disability Act Amendments Act of 2008, Pub.
L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 and 29 U.S.C. §
705). U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Div., Information and Technical Assistance on the
American with Disabilities Act, http://www.ada.gov/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2014). The United
States Department of Justice maintains a webpage devoted to the ADA, with links to agencies
that enforce the law in specific fields.
120

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C §§ 1400 et seq. (2004). The
United States Department of Education maintains a website (at http://idea.ed.gov) devoted to
the IDEA legislation, its implementing regulations, and policy guidelines. See generally
United States Department of Education, Building the Legacy: IDEA 2004,
http://idea.ed.gov/explore/home (a general introduction to the statute and the implementing
regulations).
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123 See Dov Fox and Christopher L. Griffin, Jr., Disability-Selective Abortion and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 846, 863 (2009).
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Between Families and Schools, 41 TEACHING EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 60, 60 (2000); see also
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Public awareness of these disputes regarding inclusive education may make
prospective parents wonder whether they can effectively advocate for a child with a
disability, increasing the pressure that a pregnant woman feels when she receives a
diagnosis of fetal impairment. She may even feel a duty to terminate her pregnancy,
so as not to bring a child into the world who may require a larger share of resources
from society than a “normal” child would require.125 In this manner, eugenic
perspectives can be conveyed to prospective parents without overt coercion, or even
an official policy of encouraging disability-selective abortions.126
Moreover, in many jurisdictions, encouraging “eugenic abortions” is more than
just an implied message. Rather, it is arguably an official policy – because the law
makes it easier to legally terminate a pregnancy where there is evidence of fetal
impairment. For example, the state of Utah enacted a ban on post-viability abortions
but made an exception for cases of “fetal abnormality.”127 Apparently, the legislators
who approved that exception decided that the state has less of an interest in
protecting fetal life when the future child is likely to be born with a disability.128 The
influence of eugenic thinking can also be inferred from state laws that prohibit public
funding for abortion but, once again, make an exception where prenatal testing has
revealed a fetal impairment.129
An official policy of encouraging disability-selective abortions is particularly
evident in jurisdictions that do not recognize a woman’s “right” to an abortion at any
stage of pregnancy but, instead, approach abortion from a public policy perspective
and permit the termination of pregnancies based on evidence of fetal impairment.130
A leading example of this approach is the United Kingdom, which has in turn
influenced the laws of former British colonies.131 When the United Kingdom’s law
prohibiting abortion was first liberalized in 1967, Parliament chose not to recognize
a “right” to access abortion;132 rather, it created certain exceptions to the criminal

125 See Alison Piepmeier, The Inadequacy of “Choice:” Disability and What’s Wrong With
Feminist Framings of Reproduction, 39 FEMINIST STUDIES 159, 168 (2013) (discussing her
interviews with women who decided not to terminate their pregnancies after learning that their
future child would likely have Down Syndrome, despite the fact that children with disabilities
are typically defined as being a drain on parents and on public resources).
126

See id. at 167; see also Saxton, supra note 9, at 383 (noting that it can be difficult for
pregnant women to resist the argument that it is their duty to “save scarce healthcare dollars,”
by having an abortion after prenatal testing reveals a fetal impairment).
127 See GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 5 (noting exception for “fetal abnormality in Utah’s
ban on abortions after viability).
128

See id.

129 See id. (noting exceptions for “fetal abnormality to restrictions on abortion or funding
for abortion in the states of Maryland, Mississippi, Virginia, Utah).
130

See Carole J. Petersen, Reproduction and Family Planning: Individual Right or Public
Policy?, in HONG KONG, CHINA AND 1997: ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 261, 280 (Raymond
Wacks, ed., 1993) [hereinafter Petersen, Reproduction].
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See id. at 272–80 (analyzing the British law of abortion and its influence on Hong Kong

law).
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prohibitions on abortion.133 As enacted, the 1967 Act provided that a person would
not be guilty of an offense if two registered medical practitioners were of the
opinion, formed in good faith:
(a) that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of
the pregnant woman, or of injury to the physical or mental health of the
pregnant woman or any existing children of her family, greater than if the
pregnancy were terminated; or
(b) that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer
from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously
handicapped.134
Thus, a woman carrying a “normal” fetus would be required to demonstrate that
the pregnancy presented some sort of danger to her physical or mental health or to
that of her family. In contrast, Parliament assumed that a substantial risk that the
future child would be “seriously handicapped” would justify terminating a
pregnancy, without any need to demonstrate a negative impact on the pregnant
woman or her family.135 It has been suggested that Parliament enacted this clause in
response to the disabilities caused by thalidomide, a medication once prescribed for
pregnant women in the United Kingdom which was later discovered to cause severe
impairments in their unborn children.136 Interestingly, however, Parliament did not
limit the exemption to particular impairments or make any effort to define, in the
statute, what impairments would be considered sufficiently serious to justify an
abortion.137 That decision was left to the discretion of the woman requesting the
abortion and the two certifying doctors.138 This means that the statute can be relied
upon to terminate a pregnancy even when the impairment is not considered
incompatible with a full life.139
The time limits for abortion under British law are also revealing. Although the
1967 Act set the legal limit for most abortions at 28 weeks, this was reduced to 24
weeks in 1990 because it was recognized that premature babies can survive if born at
24 weeks.140 But the 24-week time limit was only applied to abortions sought on the
broad ground that the pregnancy endangers the physical or mental health of a
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pregnant woman or her family.141 The law permits an abortion much later in
pregnancy if it threatens the woman’s life or is likely to cause “grave permanent
injury” to her physical or mental health.142 Late-term abortions are also permitted
where “there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such
physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped.143 Indeed, assuming
that the woman finds two doctors who are willing to approve it, an abortion could
legally be performed on the basis of “abnormality” right up through the ninth month
of pregnancy.
This aspect of British abortion law is controversial among certain members of
Parliament and their constituents, generating a Parliamentary Inquiry to review the
statutory provision that allows abortion on the basis of disability up until birth.144
The findings were published in 2013 and noted, in the summary, that the “majority
of those in medical bodies and involved in fetal medicine strongly argued that the
law is right for the small number of difficult cases where parents face a late
discovery of the child’s disability” and that the law does not affect public attitudes
towards persons with disabilities.145 However, a majority of those who made
submissions felt otherwise and the report recommended that “[i]f the time limit for
abortions on the grounds of disability remains to birth, there should be additional
written justification for abortions on the grounds of disability after 24 weeks, which
should be subject to audit.”146
This report does not necessarily indicate the views of Parliament generally147 and
it is presently unclear whether the law will be changed. Moreover, even if the
recommended amendment is made, British law will still include “serious handicap”
as an express and distinct ground for abortion, giving the law a decidedly eugenic
tone. The public commentary on the Parliamentary Inquiry indicates that British prochoice organizations were not moved by the testimony of those who feel that the
current British abortion law discriminates based on disability.148 Similarly, Marsha
141 Abortion Act, (1967) §1, 87 HALS. STAT. available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1967/87/section/1/enacted.
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Saxton of the World Institute on Disability (who has written extensively on the need
for greater communication between feminists and disability rights activists) has
observed that American pro-choice feminists (and American society generally) have
traditionally been isolated from persons with disabilities, making it difficult to fully
appreciate their perspectives on abortion.149 The other challenge to communication is
that pro-choice organizations genuinely feel that access to safe and legal abortion
services is tenuous, particularly in countries like the United Kingdom, where access
to abortion has not been established as a constitutional right and thus could be taken
away through the ordinary legal process.150 As a result, feminists may feel that it is
simply too dangerous to support any new restrictions on the legal grounds for
terminating a pregnancy.151
Comparative research on access to abortion helps to illustrate this point.
According to the Center for Reproductive Rights, approximately 60 countries now
permit women to terminate a pregnancy, at least during early pregnancy, without
regard to the reason for termination.152 However, twice that number (approximately
125 countries) maintain very restrictive abortion laws.153 Approximately 30 countries
have liberalized their abortion laws in the past two decades.154 But this does not
necessarily mean that these 30 countries now recognize that a woman has a “right”
to abortion. Rather, many countries have followed an approach that is conceptually
similar to the British Parliament’s approach in 1967 – maintaining the general
prohibition on abortion but permitting pregnancy termination in certain
“exceptional” situations, including fetal impairment.155 From the perspective of prochoice feminists, this is not ideal because they would prefer that women have an
unqualified right to choose whether to continue a pregnancy.156 However, if a
right’, The Telegraph, (Jan. 31, 2013, 3:53 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
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149
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national legislature is not willing to recognize a “right” to abortion, then most prochoice feminists will probably support exceptions to the laws that criminalize
abortion, including exceptions based upon fetal impairment.157 From their
perspective, even if these statutory exceptions reflect a eugenic tone, they are worth
maintaining because they help a certain number of women to avoid illegal and
unsafe abortions.158
As demonstrated in the next section of the article, international human rights law
and the bodies that monitor compliance with human rights treaties have largely taken
a similarly pragmatic approach to abortion and law reform. However, the
introduction of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities raises new
issues and requires us to reconsider this approach to issues of reproductive justice.
IV.
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND ACCESS TO ABORTION:
EMERGING NORMS AND THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS
OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES
Women’s advocacy groups have long argued that access to reproductive health
services (including contraception and safe legal abortion) are an integral component
of women’s rights under international human rights law.159 However, the question of
whether there is a right to abortion under international law continues to be contested.
Subsection A briefly summarizes both sides of the debate and Subsection B
analyzes, in greater detail, what the CRPD, which came into force in 2008, has
added to the analysis. Subsection C then explores the approach that the Committee
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has taken thus far, using its review of the
Initial Reports of Spain and Hungary under the CRPD as examples.
A. The Emerging “Right” to Abortion in International Law
Those who argue that there is no right to abortion in international law principally
rely on three general arguments: (1) the fetus has a right to life which should be
protected; (2) none of the core UN human rights treaties expressly mention a right to
terminate a pregnancy; and (3) international courts and treaty-monitoring bodies
should not interpret other rights (such as women’s right to life, health, bodily
integrity, or equality) as requiring states to legalize abortion or provide access to
abortion services.160
Opponents of abortion have, however, largely lost the first argument. The core
UN human rights treaties simply do not recognize a fetus as a “human” or endow the
fetus with rights under international law.161 This is a general principle,162 one that is
157
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160 For examples of this general line of argument, see generally Abortion and the Unborn
Child in International Law, THE SAN JOSE ARTICLES, available at
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consistent with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which provides
that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”163 During the
drafting of the ICCPR (one of the two treaties that translated the UDHR into binding
treaty form), proposals to protect the right to life from the moment of conception
were considered but ultimately rejected.164 The question of fetal rights was raised
again during the drafting of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).165 The
preamble to the CRC states that “the child, by reason of his physical and mental
immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal
protection, before as well as after birth,” and this language arguably implies that the
term “child” includes an unborn fetus.166 However, Article 1 of the CRC provides
the legal definition of “child” for purposes of the Convention, stating that “a child
means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law
applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.”167 Thus, it is generally agreed
that the enforceable provisions of the CRC “retain the historical understanding that
legally protected status as a human being begins at live birth.”168
On the other hand, those who argue against a right to abortion under international
law can easily win the second argument because the core UN human rights treaties
also do not expressly recognize a “right” to abortion.169 Indeed, advocates for
women’s reproductive autonomy have frequently conceded that point.170 The
CEDAW treaty comes the closest to providing an express right to control one’s
fertility, stating in Article 16, that:
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and
family relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of
men and women, the same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the
number and spacing of their children and to have access to the
information, education and means to enable them to exercise these
rights.171
On its face, this article appears to primarily focus on a woman’s right to an equal
decision-making role within her marriage and in the family. And while one can
162 See Rebecca J. Cook & Bernard M. Dickens et al., Human Rights Dynamics of Abortion
Law Reform, 25(1) HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 24 (2003) (noting that it is generally recognized that
international human rights conventions are not applicable before birth).
163 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (I) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(I)
(Dec. 10, 1948).
164
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easily infer a right to control one’s fertility from this provision, it still does not
expressly mention abortion. Thus, while the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women regularly recommends that governments relax
restrictions on abortion,172 the Committee does not try to argue that governments are
obligated to recognize a general “right” to abortion because of Article 16. Indeed, it
probably would be counterproductive to do so because many countries have already
filed reservations to Article 16, and the CEDAW Committee would like to see
governments withdraw those reservations.173
Thus, the debate regarding an emerging right to abortion in international human
rights law essentially boils down to the third issue – whether such a right is implicit
in other rights that are stated in the core UN human rights treaties. Here, the
advocates for reproductive justice have made significant progress in recent years,
relying upon a variety of provisions in the core UN human rights treaties, including
those that protect women’s rights to life, health, freedom from discrimination,
autonomy in reproductive decision-making, and freedom from cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment.174 In general, the UN agencies and human rights treatymonitoring bodies have been receptive to this approach.175 As a result, there is now
a body of international jurisprudence that recognizes certain reproductive rights,
including the right to be free from unlawful state intrusion (e.g. forced abortions or
sterilization) and the right to access certain reproductive health services, including
contraception, maternal health services, and, where necessary, abortion.176
For example, the UN Human Rights Committee (which monitors the ICCPR, a
treaty that was ratified by the United States in 1992) recognizes that laws that block
access to safe and legal abortions may violate women’s right to life.177 This is a
credible argument, given that thousands of women die annually from unsafe
abortions.178 The Human Rights Committee has thus requested that governments
inform it of “any measures taken by the State to help women prevent unwanted
172 See, e.g., Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding
Observations: Oman, para. 41, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/OMN/CO/1 (2011); Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Observations: Paraguay, para. 31,
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/PRY/CO/6 (2011).
173 See Declarations, Reservations, Objections & Notifications of Withdrawal of
Reservations Relating to the CEDAW, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/SP/2006/2 (June 23, 2006).
174
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opened for signature Mar. 31, 1953, 27 U.S.T. 1909, 193 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force
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48/104, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Art. 2(a), U.N. Doc. A/48/629 (1993).
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pregnancies, and to ensure that they do not have to undergo life-threatening
clandestine abortions.”179 The Human Rights Committee has also criticized
governments that maintain a general ban on abortion or that make accessing abortion
so difficult that women feel compelled to seek an illegal and unsafe abortion.180
It has also been recognized that overly restrictive abortion laws can lead to
violations of the right to be free from cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment,181
arising either from the need to resort to an unsafe abortion or from being forced to
carry a pregnancy to term. For example, the Committee Against Torture, the treatymonitoring body for the CAT, observed that a woman who is compelled to continue
a pregnancy after rape experiences “constant exposure to the violation committed
against her,” which can lead to traumatic stress and long-lasting psychological
problems.182 Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights held that a woman who
could not obtain an abortion in a case of severe fetal impairment “suffered acute
anguish through having to think about how she and her family would be able to
ensure the child’s welfare, happiness and appropriate long-term medical care.”183
Human rights treaty bodies have also analyzed abortion in the context of the right
to non-discrimination. Both the ICCPR and the CEDAW obligate states to prohibit
discrimination against women,184 which is defined (in the CEDAW treaty) as
including laws and policies that have the “purpose or effect” of preventing a woman
from exercising any of her human rights or fundamental freedoms on a basis of
equality with men.185 The Human Rights Committee has recognized that an absolute
prohibition on abortion, even in cases of rape, violates the state’s obligation to
ensure that women enjoy equal civil and political rights.186 Criminalizing abortion
constitutes discrimination in health care because it is a procedure that is needed only
by women and because forced pregnancy and childbirth expose women to gender-

179 See, e.g., Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 28: Equality of Rights
Between Men and Women (Art. 3), 68th Sess. Mar. 29, 2000, para. 10, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (2000).
180

See, e.g., Concluding Observation of the Human Rights Comm.: Nicaragua, para. 13,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/NIC/CO/3 (2008).
181

CAT, supra note 14, at art. 16. This treaty was ratified by the United States in 1994.

182

Concluding Observations of the Comm. Against Torture: Nicaragua, para.16, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/NIC/CO/1 (2009); see also Conclusions & Recommendations of the Comm. Against
Torture: Peru, para. 23, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/PER/CO/4 (2006) (recognizing the physical and
mental pain associated with being compelled by the law to seek an illegal and unsafe abortion
as a form of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment).
183

R. R. v. Poland, App. No. 27617/04, 53 E.H.R.R. 31, 159 (2011).

184

ICCPR, supra note 13, at art. 3; see also CEDAW, supra note 15, at art. 1.

185

CEDAW, supra note 15, at art. 1.

186

Ctr. For Reprod. Rights, Safe and Legal Abortion is a Woman’s Human Right,
(Oct. 2011),
http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/pub_fac_safeab_10.11.p
df (citing Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Peru, para. 20, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/CO/70/PE (2000)).
REPRODUCTIVERIGHTS.ORG
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specific health risks.187 The potential impact of being legally compelled to continue a
pregnancy was illustrated in L.C. v. Peru, a communication brought under the
CEDAW Optional Protocol.188 A teenager became pregnant as a result of sexual
abuse and attempted to commit suicide by jumping from a tall building.189 She
required emergency surgery to address the injury to her spine and alleged that the
public hospital declined to perform the surgery because it posed a risk to the
pregnancy.190 The hospital also refused to perform an abortion, despite the fact that
“therapeutic abortion” was supposed to be legal in Peru and the pregnancy posed a
danger to L.C.’s physical and mental health.191 The surgery was not performed until
three months later (after L.C. had spontaneously miscarried) and L.C. alleged that
the delay caused her paralysis.192 The CEDAW Committee decided that the refusal
to terminate the pregnancy and perform the necessary surgery in a timely manner
constituted a violation of Articles 2(c) and (f), 3, 5, and 12, together with Article 1 of
the CEDAW treaty.193
More recently, the CEDAW Committee submitted a statement on sexual and
reproductive rights to the International Conference on Population and Development
(ICPD) Beyond 2014 Review.194 Although the statement devotes only one full
paragraph to abortion, it takes a clear position, noting that “unsafe abortion is a
leading cause of maternal mortality and morbidity” and that states should therefore
“legalize abortion at least in cases of rape, incest, threats to the life and/or health of

187 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General
Recommendation No. 24: Article 12 of the Convention (Women and Health), 20th Sess.,1999,
U.N. Doc. A/54/38/Rev.1, chap. I (1999), available at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm#recom24 (noting,
in para 31(c), that states should “[p]rioritize the prevention of unwanted pregnancy through
family planning and sex education and reduce maternal mortality rates through safe
motherhood services and prenatal assistance” and that [w]hen possible, legislation
criminalizing abortion could be amended to remove punitive provisions imposed on women
who undergo abortion.”).
188

Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, G.A. res. 54/4, annex, 54 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 5, U.N. Doc.
A/54/49 (Vol. I) (Dec. 22, 2000), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/OPCEDAW.aspx.
189

CEDAW, Communication No. 22/2009, L.C. v. Peru, 50th Sess., Oct. 18, 2009, U.N.
Doc. CEDAW/C/50/D/22/2009, § 2.1 (adopted Oct. 17, 2011), available at
http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/CEDAW-C-50-D-222009%20English%20%28clean%20copy%29.pdf.
190

Id. § 8.12.

191

Id. § 6.8.

192

Id. § 8.18.

193

Id. § 8.17.

194

CEDAW, Statement of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women on Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights: Beyond 2014 ICPD Review, 55th
Sess., Feb. 10–28, 2014, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/2014/I/CRP (2014), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CEDAW/Statements/SRHR26Feb2014.pdf.
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the mother, or severe fetal impairment,” as well as removing punitive measures for
women who undergo abortion.195
The summary provided above is just a small sample of the many occasions in
which the core UN human rights treaty-monitoring bodies have recognized that
denying a woman access to an abortion when she requests one could constitute a
violation of her rights under international law. These statements by the treaty bodies
(generally given in the course of Concluding Observations on governments’ periodic
reports or in decisions on individual communications) are not, strictly speaking,
binding on all States Parties to the relevant treaties.196 However, the opinions of the
treaty-monitoring bodies are considered highly authoritative interpretations197 and it
is clear that the advocates for reproductive freedom are gaining ground in the
jurisprudence of international human rights.198
The next subsection considers the approach taken in the Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which is longer and far more detailed than
previous human rights treaties and has several articles that are relevant to the right to
life, the right to create a family, and the right to reproductive health services.
B. The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
The CRPD is considered historic because it rejects the outdated medical and
social welfare approaches to disability.199 Instead, the CRPD provides legal
authority for the social and human rights models of disability.200 The social model is
a generic term for a theory of disability that was developed in the 1960s by British
activists advocating for the right to live independently.201 It distinguishes between
195

Id.

196

Univ. Bristol & Arts & Humanities Research Council, Implementation of UN Treaty
Body Concluding Observations: The Role of National and Regional Mechanisms in Europe,
UNHR.ORG (Sept. 20 2011),
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/HRTD/docs/Summary_Proceedings_Bristol_Sept2011_
24.10.2011.pdf.
197 See Opening address by Ms Navi Pillay, High Commissioner for Human Rights to the
Informal meeting, Intergovernmental process on the strengthening of the Human Rights
Treaty Bodies, July 16, 2012, United Nations Headquarters, New York, at:
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=12361&LangID=e
; and Navanethem Pillay, STRENGTHENING THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY
BODY SYSTEM: A REPORT BY THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
(June 2012), at Foreword and p. 82.
198

Isfahan Merali, Advancing Women's Reproductive and Sexual Health Rights: Using the
International Human Rights System, 10 DEV. IN PRAC. 609, 614–20 (2010).
199 Mary Crock, Ron McCallum & Christine Ernst, Where Disability and Displacement
Intersect: Asylum Seekers with Disabilities, 24 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 735, 735 (Sept. 2011). The
medical model focused on individual “afflictions” and the need for treatment, while the
welfare model focused on the need to protect and support “disabled” individuals. Id.
200 Michael Palmer & David Harley, Models and Measurement in Disability: An
International Review, 27 HEALTH POL’Y PLAN. 357, 359 (2011).
201

See Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation, CTR. DISABILITY STUDIES
(amended Sept. 8, 1976), http://disability-studies.leeds.ac.uk/files/library/UPIAS-UPIAS.pdf;
see also Vic Finkelstein, The Social Model of Disability Repossessed, Coalition, CTR.
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impairments and disability, which it defines as a form of social oppression that is
perpetuated by physical and social barriers.202 The human rights model is similar to
the social model in that it views people who live with impairments as rights holders
and recognizes that they are often more disabled by physical and attitudinal barriers
than by individual impairments.203 However, the human rights model expressly
includes economic, social, and cultural rights (what some scholars refer to as
“second generation rights”), which are necessary for many persons to live with
dignity and achieve equality.204
The CRPD is also historic because of the manner in which it was drafted.
Traditionally, new treaties have been drafted primarily by diplomats during closeddoor meetings.205 In the case of the CRPD, there was an unusually high level of
input from civil society, far exceeding that for previous human rights treaties.206
This was largely because the disability rights movement insisted on the right to
participate.207 Governments were urged to appoint citizens with disabilities to the
official delegations and to actively consult disability rights organizations.208 Activists
also organized at the local and regional levels and submitted written comments to the
Ad Hoc Committee that drafted the treaty.209 The large number of submissions
generated vigorous debates on the language of the CRPD.210
DISABILITY STUDIES (Dec. 1, 2002), available at http://www.leeds.ac.uk/disabilitystudies/archiveuk/finkelstein/soc%20mod%20repossessed.pdf.
202

Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation, supra note 201.

203

See Arlene S. Kanter, The Promise and Challenge of the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 287, 291 (2007);
Rosemary Kayess & Phillip French, Out of Darkness Into Light? Introducing the Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 2 (2008).
204

See Michael Ashley Stein, Disability Human Rights, 95 CAL. L. REV. 75, 93 (2007)
(discussing the shortcomings of the social model and the importance of including economic
and social rights in the “disability human rights” model).
205 Katherine Guernsey, Marcolo Nicoli & Alberto Ninio, CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: ITS IMPLEMENTATION AND RELEVANCE FOR THE WORLD BANK 1
(2007).
206 See HUMAN RIGHTS & DISABILITY ADVOCACY 5 (Maya Sabatello & Marianne Schulze,
eds. 2014); see also U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General Hails Adoption of Landmark
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities , U.N. Doc. SG/SM/10797 (Dec. 13,
2006), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2006/sgsm10797.doc.htm (describing
the CRPD as the first human rights treaty to emerge from lobbying conducted extensively
through the internet).
207 Jerry Alan Winter, The Development of the Disability Rights Movement as a Social
Problem Solver, 23 DISABILITIES STUD. Q. 33, 46 (2003).
208 Tara J. Melish, Perspectives on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: The UN CRPD:
Historic Process, Strong Prospects, and Why the U.S. Should Ratify, 14 HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF
37 (2007).
209 Nicholas Caivano, Conceptualizing Capacity: Interpreting Canada’s Qualified
Ratification of Article 12 of the UN Disability Rights Convention, 4 W. J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6
(2014).
210 See id. at 2; see also UNITEDNATIONSENABLE.ORG,
http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=1423 (last visited Oct. 18, 2014) (providing
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One of these debates was on the question of whether and how to define disability.
Some argued that any definition that employed medical terminology would
undermine the treaty’s commitment to the social model.211 Others argued for a
detailed definition out of fear that persons with certain types of disabilities might
otherwise be excluded from national laws that purported to implement the treaty.212
The final version of the CRPD reflects a compromise. Although “disability” is not
defined in the definitions section of the treaty, Article One states that the purpose of
the CRPD is to “promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all
human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities” and that
“[p]ersons with disabilities include those with long-term physical, mental,
intellectual or sensory impairments which, in interaction with various barriers may
hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with
others.”213 Thus, while the treaty expressly includes certain groups, it does not
purport to define the full scope of the term “persons with disabilities,” leaving the
issue to be determined through activism and the continuing efforts of the disability
rights movement.214 It also emphasizes the core principle of the social model, that it
is not simply “impairments” that create disability but the manner in which socially
constructed barriers interact with individual conditions.215
In light of the history of eugenic policies, it is not surprising that the CRPD
specifically addresses issues relating to the rights to life, marriage, and reproduction.
Three Articles are particularly relevant. Article 10 affirms that every human being
has the inherent right to life, and obligates States Parties to take all necessary
measures to ensure the effective enjoyment by persons with disabilities on an equal
basis with others.216 Article 23 obligates States Parties to take steps to “eliminate
discrimination against persons with disabilities in all matters relating to marriage,
family, parenthood and relationships” and strongly condemns any form of statesponsored sterilization, providing that persons with disabilities “shall retain their
fertility.”217 Article 25, which provides for the right to health, expressly requires
States Parties to provide persons with disabilities equal access to sexual and
reproductive health services.218 In particular, Article 25 states that persons with
disabilities should be provided “with the same range, quality and standard of free or
affordable health care and programmes as provided to other persons, including in the
drafts of the treaty, submissions, lists of attendees, and other documents arising from the eight
sessions of the Ad Hoc Committee that drafted the treaty).
211

Palmer & Harley, supra note 200.

212

Bill Frist, Why the U.S. Must Lead on Disabilities Treaty, REUTERS (Nov. 5 2013),
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/11/05/why-the-u-s-must-lead-on-disabilitiestreaty/.
213

CRPD, supra note 17, at art. 1 (emphasis added).

214

Maya Sabatello, A Short History of the Movement, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISABILITY
ADVOCACY 19 (Maya Sabatello and Marianne Schulze, eds., 2014).
215

Id.

216

CRPD, supra note 17, at art. 10.

217

Id. at art. 23.

218

Id. at art. 25.
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area of sexual and reproductive health and population-based public health
programmes.”219
The records of the Ad Hoc Committee that drafted the CRPD highlight the
competing views on the appropriate wording of these articles and demonstrate that
access to sexual and reproductive health services was a particularly contentious
issue.220 As a result, the language was substantially revised from the first draft, so as
to become “far less explicit and affirmative” regarding sexuality. 221 The Holy See,
which has observer status at the United Nations, played a significant role in this
process; for example, it objected to any language referring to “sexual and
reproductive health” services on the ground that some countries would include
abortion services within this broad category.222
The Holy See was not entirely alone in its concern that abortion services could be
conflated with a general right to sexual and reproductive health. Other participants in
the drafting process were also deeply concerned by the phenomena of disabilityselective abortion.223 Approximately halfway through the drafting process, a working
group submitted a proposal for the text of the draft of Article 8 on the “right to
life”.224 That draft expressly stated that “[d]isability is not a justification for the
termination of life” and that States Parties to the treaty “shall undertake effective
measures to the prohibition of compulsory abortion at the instance of the State based
on the prenatal diagnosis of disability.”225 However, this language did not make it
into the final version of the treaty.226 Although the working group stressed that it
was not seeking to reduce the freedom of women to make their own decisions, the
proposed language stating that, “disability should not be a justification for the
termination of life,” raised concerns among many participants who supported
women’s right to choose.227
Some of the groups that commented on the drafts of the CRPD thus sought to
find language that would represent a compromise: a way to preserve a woman’s right
to reproductive freedom, while also creating a state obligation to prevent compulsory
abortion and a minimal duty to encourage prospective parents not to terminate a
219

Id.

220

See Mi Yeon Kim, Women with Disabilities, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISABILITY
ADVOCACY 113, 123 (Maya Sabatello and Marianne Schulze, eds., 2014).
221 Marta Schaaf, Negotiating Sexuality in the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, 8 SUR INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 113, 113 (2011), available at
http://www.surjournal.org/eng/conteudos/pdf/14/06.pdf.
222

Id. at 123. For further discussion of the Holy See’s position on international instruments
that address reproductive rights, see Chad Marzen, The Holy See’s Worldwide Role and
International Human Rights: Solely Symbolic?, 27 UNIV. OF DETROIT MERCY L. REV. 659
(2009).
223

Schaaf, supra note 221, at 115.

224

Lex Grandia, Imagine: To Be a Part of This, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISABILITY
ADVOCACY 146, 152 (Maya Sabatello and Marianne Schulze, eds., 2014).
225

Id.

226

Id.
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pregnancy solely because of disability.228 A coalition of Australian disability rights
groups put forth the following suggestion:
This [issue] obviously presents a difficult ethical challenge, not least
because of its potential impact on the choice of women in relation to
pregnancy. However, it might be possible to address this issue more
indirectly. For example, much of the information that is made available to
parents at the time of genetic testing and immediately following the birth
of a child with disability is overwhelmingly negative and inaccurate, and
induces parents to opt for termination of pregnancy or withdrawal of lifesustaining treatments. It is possible to impose an obligation on States to
ensure that prospective parents of a child with disability receive positive
and realistic orientation to their child and its future life. This may reduce
the chances that parents will opt for termination of pregnancy.229
Ultimately, however, the drafters of the CRPD agreed to describe the “right to
life” in very simple terms. The provision on the “right to life” (which is numbered
Article 10 in the final version of the CRPD) does not refer to “the unborn” and it
does not state that life begins at conception.230 Nor does it impose even a minimal
obligation on governments to provide prospective parents with a positive view of the
prospect of raising a child with a disability. This decision can be explained by the
concern that any language referring to the status of the unborn or the procedures that
should be followed before a pregnant woman can obtain an abortion would have
opened a “Pandora’s box,” one that would have been extremely difficult to close
because abortion is such a divisive topic.231 As such, the drafters decided against
including any express reference to abortion within the treaty.232
The drafters did, however, retain the language relating to the right of persons
with disabilities to access reproductive health services in Article 25.233 The right to
decide on the number and spacing of children, first stated in Article 16 of the
CEDAW treaty, also appears in Article 23 of the CRPD.234 Indeed, the language is
arguably stronger in the CRPD, as it provides that States Parties should ensure that:
“The rights of persons with disabilities to decide freely and responsibly on the
number and spacing of their children and to have access to age-appropriate
information, reproductive and family planning education are recognized, and the
228 United Nations Enable, UN Convention on the Rights of People With Disabilities,
Fourth Session of the Ad Hoc Committee, Daily Summary of Discussions Related to Article
8: Right to Life, Aug. 4, 2004 [hereinafter Right to Life Discussion]
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc4sumart08.htm.
229 U.N. Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities, Proposals and
Amendments Submitted Electronically, Fourth Session Comments by People with
Disability Australia (2006),
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahcstata11fscomments.htm.
230

See CRPD, supra note 17, at art. 10.

231

See Right to Life Discussion, supra note 228.

232

Id.

233

CRPD, supra note 17, at art. 25.

234

Id. at art. 23.
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means necessary to enable them to exercise these rights are provided.”235 This is
important because, contrary to stereotypes, persons with disabilities have active
sexual lives.236 Moreover, sexually active women who are capable of becoming
pregnant generally want the ability to control their fertility at certain stages in their
lives.237 The Holy See responded to these drafting decisions by declining to sign the
CRPD.238 Although it had originally been a strong supporter of the idea of a treaty
on the rights of persons with disabilities, the Holy See was unwilling to sign a
document that might be interpreted as supporting a right to access contraception or
abortion services.239
The debate on whether the CRPD obligates states to change their laws regarding
abortion did not end with the drafting process. As discussed in the next subsection,
this debate has reemerged during the international reporting process, the primary
enforcement process for the CRPD and for the other core UN human rights treaties.
C. The Approach of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to
Abortion on the Ground of Fetal Impairment
The international reporting process for the CRPD is overseen by the Committee
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, a panel of independent experts on
disability rights from around the world who serve in their personal capacity.240 When
a state ratifies the CRPD, its national government is obligated to submit a
comprehensive “Initial Report” of its implementation of the treaty within two years
of becoming a State Party.241 The Initial Report is intended to describe both the
progress toward implementation and any barriers preventing full compliance with
the treaty.242 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) often provide input as the
Committee prepares its “List of Issues,” an official document seeking supplementary

235 Id. at art. 23(1)(d). In contrast, the CEDAW treaty only provides (at art. 16) that
women should have equal rights with men to determine the number and spacing of their
children.
236

See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION & UNITED NATIONS POPULATION FUND, PROMOTING
SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 7 (2009) [hereinafter
WHO & UNFPA]; see generally Michael L. Perlin and Alison J. Lynch, All His Sexless
Patients: Persons with Mental Disabilities and the Competence to Have Sex, 89 WASH. L.
REV. 258 (2014).
237

WHO & UNFPA, supra note 236, at 7.

238

Letter from H.E. Archbishop Celestino Migliore, Apostolic Noncio, Permanent
Observer of the Holy See to H.E. Sheikha Haya Rashed Al Khalifa, President of 61st General
Assembly of the United Nations (Dec. 13, 2006) (on file with author).
239

Id.

240

See CRPD, supra note 17, at art. 34 (providing for the establishment of a Committee on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, consisting of twelve experts of high moral standing
and recognized competence and experience, to be elected by the States Parties) and art. 34(3)
(providing that members serve in their personal capacity).
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CRPD, supra note 17, at art. 35(1).
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information from the State Party on topics that were not included in the Initial
Report or which the Committee believes were not adequately addressed.243
NGOs also regularly submit “alternative” or “shadow reports” that comment on
the official report and point out governmental failures to comply with the treaty.244
When all of this documentation has been submitted, and usually published on the
Committee’s website, the Committee conducts a formal public review of the state’s
Initial Report and issues “Concluding Observations,” advising the government of its
concerns and suggestions for implementation of the treaty.245 The process is
essentially a dialogue between the Committee and the government delegation
representing the State Party. As such, the Committee is careful to phrase its
recommendations in diplomatic language. Although the Committee cannot compel a
government to comply with its recommendations, civil society can use the
Concluding Observations to lobby for law and policy reforms at the domestic
level.246
The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities commenced operations
in 2008, shortly after the CRPD received its twentieth ratification and entered into
force as a binding multilateral treaty.247 Spain’s Initial Report on the implementation
of the CRPD was submitted in 2010 and it became the second state report reviewed
by the Committee.248 Spain serves as an illustrative case study of the potential impact
of the CRPD reporting process, partly because the Spanish government attempted to
reduce women’s access to legal abortion soon after the Committee’ review of
Spain’s Initial Report.
In 1985, Spain legalized abortion under certain circumstances, including fetal
impairment.249 In 2009, under the rule of the Socialist Party, the government
conducted a review of the abortion law. This process led to a more liberal legislative

243 PEGGY BRETT AND PATRICK MUTZENBERG, CENTRE FOR CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS,
U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE PARTICIPATION IN THE REPORTING PROCESS: GUIDELINES FOR
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 10–11 (2010).
244

See Disabled Persons’ International, SHADOW REPORTING GUIDELINES ON THE
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES FOR DISABLED PEOPLES’
ORGANIZATIONS (DPO) AND CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS (Dec. 2012).
245

CRPD, supra note 17, at art. 35.

246 For analysis of the role of civil society in a similar process under the CEDAW, see
Carole J. Petersen and Harriet Samuels, The International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women: A Comparison of Its Implementation and the Role
of Non-Governmental Organizations in the United Kingdom and Hong Kong, 26 HASTINGS
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 1 (2002).
247 Press Release, Landmark UN Treaty on Rights of Persons with Disabilities Enters Into
Force (May 3, 2008), available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=26554#.
248 Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Initial
Reports Submitted by States Parties in Accordance with Article 35 of the Convention: Spain,
May 3, 2010, U.N. Doc. CRPD/C/ESP/1 [hereinafter Spain Initial Report].
249 Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United
Nations Secretariat, Population Policy Data Bank: Spain 2 [hereinafter Population Policy
Data Bank: Spain] http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/abortion/doc/spain.doc.
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framework, which was enacted in 2010.250 Under Article 14 of the 2010 law, which
is still in force, a pregnancy can be lawfully terminated within the first fourteen
weeks at the request of the pregnant woman, provided that she receives counseling,
pursuant to Articles 17(2) and 17(4), and waits at least three days after counseling
before having the abortion.251 It is estimated that 90% of all abortions since 2012
have been conducted under this provision, within the first 14 weeks of pregnancy.252
However, Article 15 of the 2010 law, entitled “Termination on Health Grounds”
provides that a pregnancy can also be terminated for “medical reasons” later in
pregnancy, under any one of the following circumstances:
(a) Prior to the twenty-second week of pregnancy, if the woman’s life or
health is in serious risk, as confirmed in advance by a medical
specialist not performing or supervising the procedure. Confirmation
will not be required in emergency cases of immediately lifethreatening risk.
(b) Prior to the twenty-second week of pregnancy, provided that there is
a risk of serious fetal anomalies, as confirmed in advance by two
medical specialists not performing or supervising the procedure.
(c) In case of fetal anomalies incompatible with life as confirmed in
advance by a medical specialist not performing or supervising the
procedure, or when the fetus is found to suffer from an extremely
serious condition that is incurable at the time of diagnosis, as
confirmed by a Medical Committee.253
Thus, under the 2010 law, a “risk of serious fetal anomalies” automatically
extends the period of lawful abortion by an additional eight weeks. Moreover, an
abortion can legally be performed at any time during the pregnancy if the Medical
Committee confirms that “the fetus . . . suffer[s] from an extremely serious condition
that is incurable at the time of diagnosis.”254
Although the Spanish government was drafting its Initial Report to the
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities at approximately the same time
that it enacted the 2010 abortion law, its Initial Report under the CRPD did not
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mention the ongoing reforms to Spain’s abortion law.255 Nor did Spain’s Initial
Report mention the exception for abortion on the ground of fetal impairment,
although this had been part of Spanish law since 1985.256 The issue was, however,
raised by the Comité Español de Representantes de Personas con Discapacidad, an
NGO appointed by the Spanish government as an independent monitoring body to
promote implementation of the CRPD.257 Its alternative report to the Committee on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities highlighted the 2010 law on abortion and
used the term “eugenic abortion” to describe abortions that are authorized on the
basis of fetal impairment.258
This alternative report was reviewed by the Committee on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities, which then used the “List of Issues” mechanism to obtain more
information, asking the Spanish government to:
[P]rovide information on the new Organic Act 2/2010 of 3 March 2010 on
sexual and reproductive health and the voluntary termination of
pregnancy, in particular the longer time limits allowed for terminating
pregnancies when the fetus has a disability. Does the Government of
Spain consider this to be in line with [A]rticle 4, paragraph 1(d), of the
Convention?259
It is noteworthy that the Committee did not request this information under the
heading of Article 10, which provides for the right to life, but does not refer to the
unborn and, as discussed above, does not address the issue of disability-selective
abortion.260 Rather, the Committee asked for the information under the heading of
Article 4, which describes “general obligations” of the countries that ratify the
CRPD.261 In particular, Article 4 obligates States Parties to “undertake to ensure and
promote the full realization of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
persons with disabilities without discrimination of any kind on the basis of
disability”262 and “to refrain from engaging in any act or practice that is inconsistent
with the present Convention and to ensure that public authorities and institutions act
in conformity with the present Convention.”263 Thus, the Committee implicitly
categorized a law that makes it easier to terminate a pregnancy in cases of fetal
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impairment as discriminatory, despite the absence of any reference to the unborn as
“rights holders” under the treaty.
In its response, the Spanish government confirmed that an abortion could be
lawfully performed much later in pregnancy in cases of fetal impairment, but also
explained that a woman would have access to support services if she decided to
continue the pregnancy.264 The Spanish government also reminded the Committee
that the CRPD does not require a government to protect life before birth.265
Consistent with previous international law and practice, Article 10 of the CRPD is
silent on the issue, leaving each state to determine when life begins according to its
own constitution and legal principles.266 However, in the eyes of the Committee
members, this was apparently irrelevant -- because it was not seeking information
regarding the legality of abortion generally but rather regarding the differential
treatment of pregnancies on the basis of fetal impairment.
During the public hearing on Spain’s Initial Report, a member of the Committee
raised the issue again, asking why the legal period of abortion was longer in cases of
fetal impairment.267 Not receiving a satisfactory answer, the Committee included the
following statement in its Concluding Observations on Spain’s Initial Report:
The Committee takes note of Act 2/2010 of 3 March 2010 on sexual and
reproductive health, which decriminalizes voluntary termination of
pregnancy, allows pregnancy to be terminated up to 14 weeks and
includes two specific cases in which the time limits for abortion are
extended if the foetus has a disability: until [twenty-two] weeks of
gestation, provided there is “a risk of serious anomalies in the foetus”, and
beyond week [twenty-two] when, inter alia, “an extremely serious and
incurable illness is detected in the foetus”. The Committee also notes the
explanations provided by the State party for maintaining this distinction.
The Committee recommends that the State party abolish the distinction
made in Act 2/2010 in the period allowed under law within which a
pregnancy can be terminated based solely on disability.268
264 Respuestas del Gobierno de España a la lista de cuestiones (CRPD/C/ESP/Q/1) que
deben abordarse al examinar el informe inicial de España (CRPD/C/ESP/1) [Reply of Spain
to the List of Issues of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, U.N. Doc.
CRPD/C/ESP/Q/1/Add.1], Comité sobre los Derechos de las Personas con Discapacidad
[Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities], 4–5 (2011) (Spain),
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRPD%2f
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The following year, the Committee made similar comments on Hungary’s Initial
Report.269 However, in some ways, the Committee’s comments to the Hungarian
government were even stronger in that it expressly categorized a law that allows for
abortions in cases of fetal impairment as a form of discrimination on the ground of
disability, which is prohibited under Article 5 of the CRPD.270 The Committee
expressed concern that Hungary’s law allows abortion “for a wider circle than in
general for the fetuses deemed to have health damage or some disability, thereby
discriminating on the basis of disability.”271 It appears that the Committee is
implicitly taking the position that a fetus enjoys rights under the CRPD, despite the
lack of any explicit statement to this effect in the treaty.272 If this is the case, the
Committee’s approach marks a departure from the predominant approach in
international law, which has traditionally not provided for fetal rights in human
rights treaties but rather allowed each individual state to determine whether a fetus
enjoys legal rights within that state’s domestic legal system.273 It should be noted that
the right to non-discrimination is defined in the CRPD to include the right to
reasonable accommodations; thus if a fetus does enjoy a right to non-discrimination
under the CRPD then this would also include a right to receive reasonable
accommodations by the State Party.274 In this author’s view, the only other possible
interpretation of the Committee’s recommendation that Hungary abolish all
distinctions based upon disability in its abortion law is that the Committee may
believe that permitting abortion on the ground of fetal impairment devalues, and
therefore discriminates against, people who are already living with disabilities.
Concerned that governments may interpret the Committee’s comments as an
invitation to restrict access to abortion, reproductive rights advocates have criticized
the Committee’s recommendations to Spain and Hungary. For example, in 2013, the
Center for Reproductive Rights (CRR) submitted commentary to the Committee as
part of its “half-day discussion” on women and girls with disabilities.275 The CRR
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pointed out that the Committee’s comments to Spain and Hungary “could be
interpreted to contravene” the approach that has been established by the other UN
human rights treaty bodies, which has been to urge governments to liberalize
abortion laws and reduce the incidence of illegal and unsafe abortions that contribute
to maternal mortality.276 CRR also warned the Committee that “restricting women’s
access to legal abortion services will not prevent them from seeking to terminate a
pregnancy if they wish to do so; such restrictions will only force them to resort to
clandestine and unsafe abortions, which may place their lives and health at risk.”277
Recent events in Spain confirm that the CRR has good reason to be concerned by
the recommendations of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
In 2013, the conservative Popular Party (PP), Spain’s current ruling party, proposed
to enact a bill prohibiting abortion in most circumstances, including cases of fetal
impairment. Although the bill was titled “Anteproyecto de ley orgánica para la
protección de la vida del concebido y de los derechos de la mujer embarazada”
(which can be translated to English as “for the protection of the life of the fetus and
the rights of pregnant women”) the government’s bill leaned heavily toward
protection of the fetus.278 Indeed, had it been enacted, the bill would have
represented one of the most significant restrictions on abortion in Europe.279 First
introduced in December 2013, the bill proposed to reinstate the general prohibition
on abortion with only two exceptions: (1) abortion would be permitted up to twelve
weeks if the pregnancy was the result of sexual violence which had been reported to
the police; and (2) abortion would be permitted up to twenty-two weeks if two
doctors confirmed that the pregnancy endangered the mother’s physical or mental
health.280 As initially proposed, the government’s bill contained no exception for
cases of fetal impairment. While it is hard to assess the impact of the Concluding
Observations by the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the
timing of the bill indicates that the Committee’s views may well have influenced the
government’s position on this issue.281
The Spanish government’s proposal to prohibit almost all abortions generated
enormous anti-government protests.282 The refusal to include an exception for cases
of fetal impairment was particularly controversial and generated opposition even
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/DGD2013.aspx (accessed by clicking
submission 24).
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among members of the ruling party.283 The government initially attempted to
address this opposition by promising to word the final legislation so that a pregnant
woman could claim that her own health was endangered by a fetal impairment.284 In
the end, however, the Spanish government was compelled to withdraw the proposed
legislation altogether,285 prompting the Justice Minister to offer his resignation.286
Yet opponents of abortion in other countries will very likely seize upon the
Committee’s comments to Spain and Hungary in order to strengthen their arguments
against abortion, particularly in the second trimester of pregnancy when fetal
impairments are often diagnosed.287
V.

CONCLUSION

By commenting on the legislative frameworks for abortion in Spain and
Hungary, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has renewed the
debate on the relationship between the CRPD and the laws or government policies
that facilitate disability-selective abortion. This was probably inevitable given that
disability rights organizations have the ability to submit alternative reports to the
Committee. As more countries report to the Committee, other groups may highlight
the expanding practice of prenatal testing, the laws that treat pregnancies differently
on the ground of disability, and the “matter of fact” way that the medical profession
and the general public have come to think about abortion on the basis of fetal
impairment.
Nevertheless, in this author’s opinion, the specific comments from the
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to the governments of Spain
and Hungary were far too simplistic and do not adequately acknowledge the tensions
between reproductive freedom and the rights of persons with disabilities. The
Committee’s comments imply that it would be sufficient to amend the unequal
standards in the abortion laws, without suggesting more systemic ways of
encouraging prospective parents to voluntarily continue a pregnancy that may lead to
283 Guy Hedgecoe, Spain’s abortion legislation 'changed after protests', IRISH TIMES, June
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the birth of a child with a disability. Ironically, Spain and Hungary could both
comply with the Committee’s comments by amending their laws to provide all
women with unfettered access to abortion. Such amendments would address what
the Committee views as the formal discrimination in the legislative framework, but
would do nothing to reduce the incidence of disability-selective abortions. On the
other hand, if a country moves in the opposite direction, and reduces access to
abortion, it could have the effect of violating numerous human rights treaties,
including the CRPD, which give persons with disabilities the right to determine the
number and spacing of their children and the right to reproductive health services.288
Such legislation could also motivate more women to seek illegal and unsafe
abortions, which poses serious threats to their health and their right to life, as
observed by the CEDAW Committee, the Human Rights Committee, and the
Committee Against Torture.289
This is an opportune time for the Committee on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities to consider the relationship between abortion and disability rights
because it is in the process of developing a General Comment on Article 6 of the
CRPD, which will address the intersectionality of gender and disability
discrimination.290 With respect to abortion, the Committee on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities should examine the approach that the CEDAW Committee has
taken to the practice of sex-selection. While maintaining strong support for
women’s right to access contraception and safe abortion services, the CEDAW
Committee has also expressed concern regarding the practice of sex-selective
abortion in states where it is prevalent.291 The CEDAW Committee has not ruled out
using laws prohibiting sex selection as a means of preventing the systematic
targeting of female fetuses for abortion. For example, it has urged the Peoples’
Republic of China to enforce its law against sex selection, as well as the laws
prohibiting female infanticide.292 For the most part, however, the CEDAW
Committee has focused on the obligation of states to redress the discriminatory
attitudes and practices that lead parents to prefer male children. For example, the
CEDAW Committee expressed concern at the “persistence of deep-rooted
288
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stereotypes” that lead to sex-selective abortion in China and suggested a number of
specific measures, such as textbook reform, that might help to overcome these
stereotypes.293
In the context of disability-selective abortion, many commentators have
suggested that there should be reforms to the nature of the counseling and the
“quality of life” assessments that are provided to prospective parents after they
receive a diagnosis of fetal impairment.294 The Committee on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities should ask governments about these processes and offer its
expertise, so as to assist States Parties to the CRPD to develop a set of best practices.
Helping governments to better implement Article 24, on the right to inclusive
education, and Article 27, on the right to employment, would also give prospective
parents more confidence that their children will enjoy full and meaningful lives if
they are born with an impairment or if they acquire an impairment during life. These
are just a few examples of systemic changes that could, over the long term, reduce
the incidence of disability-selective abortion -- without insisting that governments
remove all distinctions based upon fetal impairment from the laws governing access
to abortion.
Similarly, if the state of North Dakota is serious about preventing disabilityselective abortions, then it should consider a more systemic and less coercive
approach. Even if H.B. 1305 could survive constitutional scrutiny and be enforced,
it would not prevent a woman from travelling outside North Dakota to obtain an
abortion on the ground of fetal impairment. A more effective way of encouraging
North Dakota parents to continue pregnancies where there is evidence of a fetal
disability would be to provide more public funding for inclusive education.295 To that
end, the United States ought to ratify the CRPD and use it as an additional tool in the
movement for equality. Although imperfect, the treaty represents a huge step
forward in disability rights and international human rights law. United States
ratification would help to change stereotypical perceptions and further implement the
right to equality that was originally promised in the ADA and the IDEA. As Marsha
Saxton observed many years ago, when discussing the lack of communication
between pro-choice feminists and persons with disabilities, “clearly, there is work to
be done.”296
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